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HOSTILE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS  
ARI EZRA WALDMAN∗
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article is one in a series about bullying and cyberbullying in 
schools.  I argue that the proper analysis for a First Amendment 
challenge to school discipline for off-campus misuse of the Internet to 
harm or harass a member of the school community based on the vic-
tim’s identity depends on the nature of the offending behavior.  For 
students who are punished for a single incident—what I will call 
cyberattacking—a student speech analysis that reflects the Court’s 
consistent rationale in all its student speech cases, the “substantial 
disruption” standard, makes sense.  But students who engage in a 
pattern of repeated incidents of cyberattacking—what I will call cy-
berbullying—create a hostile educational environment for their vic-
tims that parallels the behavior of harassers.  Therefore, the relative 
merit of cyberbullies’ First Amendment defenses to lawful punish-
ment should depend more on the interaction between free speech 
rights and harassment than on the interaction between free speech 
and a single incident of aggression.  And, while the Supreme Court 
has never explicitly considered a First Amendment challenge to a ha-
rassment or stalking statute, it has stated that threats fall outside the 
protections normally afforded to more valuable speech. In this con-
text, just like the state has a compelling interest in protecting captive, 
victimized minorities from hostile environments and abuse in certain 
contexts, so too does the state have a compelling interest in protecting 
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students who are bullied because of their sexual identity.  For these 
egregious cases, a First Amendment defense to discipline should fail. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Amelia and Zachary are unique.1  They are the first in their 
school to be suspended for bullying two classmates whom they have 
never confronted in person.  The offensive conduct that motivated 
the suspension took place not in the cafeteria or during study hall or 
in the locker room; rather, it took place online. Amelia and Zachary 
are cyberaggressors.2
Our antagonists are part of an increasingly common breed of 
bully that is confounding the judiciary and creating seemingly con-
flicting case law.
  Amelia created an “I Hate” video in which she 
ridiculed a fellow student for her short hair, tendency to wear boys’ 
clothing, and perceived lesbianism, and then posted the video to a so-
cial networking website for her 500 friends to see.  Zachary has been 
bullying his victim for years, using a fake online profile to post homo-
phobic slurs, spread rumors, and graphically depict his victim in 
compromising sexual situations.  Both victims reported the incidents 
to their principal and both felt embarrassed, depressed, and increa-
singly unsafe in school as a result. 
3
There are two types of peer-to-peer cyberaggression cases, each 
of which merit a different analysis to determine whether the First 
Amendment bars punishment. Few cases are as neatly framed as the 
hypotheticals involving Amelia, the single-incident cyberattacker, and 
Zachary, the repeat offender; often, students combine single or re-
peated incidents of cyberaggression with face-to-face attacks.  Amelia 
  Cyberbullies eschew traditional face-to-face harass-
ment in favor of the anesthetized distance and perceived anonymity 
of the Internet.  By taking their conduct off campus and making ex-
clusive use of cyberspace, their behavior implicates student free 
speech law in new and profound ways.  But the ways in which the First 
Amendment may interact or conflict with attempts to discipline cy-
berbullies vary.  That is, while Amelia and Zachary are composites of 
cyberaggressors recently in the news, they differ in one important re-
spect: strictly speaking, only Zachary is a cyberbully. 
 
 1. Amelia and Zachary are hypothetical characters, but are also composites of aggres-
sors in a variety of recent cyberbullying cases. 
 2. The terms “cyberaggressors,” “cyberbullying,” and “face-to-face bullying” are com-
monly used in the social science literature to distinguish between Internet-based harass-
ment and traditional in-school bullying. 
 3. Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 572–73 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(finding no First Amendment violation where school disciplined a student for the off-
campus creation of a “hate website” that attacked a student), with Layshock v. Hermitage 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a school could not punish a stu-
dent for off-campus online speech merely because the speech was vulgar and reached in-
side the school). 
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resembles both the alleged cyberbully in J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified 
School District,4 which involved a student who created a YouTube5 vid-
eo criticizing another student, and the roommate of Tyler Clementi, a 
Rutgers University student who committed suicide after his roommate 
surreptitiously streamed via Twitter6 a video of Clementi with another 
young man.7
J.C. and Clementi’s cases, on the one hand, differ starkly from 
stories like Kylie Kenney’s,
  
8 Phoebe Prince’s,9 and Ryan Halligan’s,10
Despite the difference between a single incident and a pattern of 
conduct, the few courts to address First Amendment defenses to a 
school’s discipline of bullies and cyberbullies have approached both 
cases through the lens of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District’s “substantial disruption” standard.
 
on the other.  The aggressors in the latter cases resemble our hypo-
thetical Zachary, a tormenter who repeatedly used the Internet, social 
networking websites, and other cybertechnologies to bully and harass 
a victim over time.  Neither scenario is necessarily more harmful or 
tragic than the other; after all, both Clementi and Ryan Halligan 
committed suicide.  Nor are the two necessarily mutually exclusive—
the video in J.C. may have been the subject of a lawsuit, but could 
have been part of a pattern of conduct.  What distinguishes these two 
categories of cases is the repetition of the offending behavior. 
11
 
 4. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
  Tinker is the foun-
dation of the Supreme Court’s student-speech jurisprudence, so it 
would make sense for courts to default to that case for adjudicating 
students’ free speech rights.  Some courts have argued that because 
 5. YouTube is a video-sharing website on which users can upload, share, and view vid-
eos.  See www.youtube.com. 
 6. Twitter is a social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to 
send and read short messages under 140 characters.  A “tweet” can include a hyperlink to 
another website, photograph, or, in this case, a video.  See www.twitter.com. 
 7. See Richard Perez-Pena, Stricter Law on Bullying in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 
2011, at A18.  Clementi’s roommate was convicted on 15 charges, including bias intimida-
tion.  See Kate Zernike, Jury Finds Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
17, 2012, at A1. 
 8. Suzanne Struglinski, Schoolyard Bullying Has Gone High-Tech, DESERET MORNING 
NEWS, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/645194065/ 
Schoolyard-bullying-has-gone-high-tech.html. 
 9. Emily Bazelon, Bullies Beware: Massachusetts Just Passed the Country’s Best Anti-Bullying 
Law, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2010, 4:13 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2252543/. 
 10. RYAN’S STORY, www.ryanpatrickhalligan.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 11. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).  Tinker concerned a student protest in which a group of 
students wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.  Pursuant to a recently adopted 
school policy against such protests, the students were suspended until they would return to 
school without the armbands.  Id. at 504.  
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the Court has maintained the Tinker standard and carved out three 
limited exceptions for three unique situations,12
What’s more, Zachary and Amelia are different kinds of aggres-
sors.  True bullying is characterized by repeated conduct, and when a 
pattern of harassment is directed against a victim because of real or 
perceived sexuality or nonconforming sexual behavior, that bullying 
is strikingly similar to hostile environment harassment.  It stands to 
reason that the merit of a First Amendment defense to a school’s au-
thority to punish Zachary, the cyberbully who engaged in a pattern of 
harassing conduct over time, should fail just like a free speech chal-
lenge to a harassment or stalking statute will fail. 
 Tinker remains the 
standard by which they should determine if the First Amendment bars 
punishment of students like Amelia and Zachary.  But, as currently 
understood, the “substantial disruption” standard is, at best, unclear: 
courts seem incapable of connecting a “substantial disruption” with 
the potentially devastating effects on a student, group of students, and  
school community when individuals are targeted for aggression based 
on their identity. 
I argue that the proper analysis for a student’s First Amendment 
challenge to school discipline for off-campus misuse of the Internet to 
harm or attack another member of the school community depends on 
the nature of the offending behavior.  For students who are punished 
for a single incident—what I will call cyberattacking—a student 
speech analysis still makes sense.  The kind of disruptions Tinker and 
its progeny envisioned were never limited to a protest-related fracas, 
but rather include the harm to the school’s ability to teach its students 
successfully and the impairment of rights caused by cyberharassment: 
it harms the victim’s ability to access his equal right to an education, 
destroys the victim’s community, and disrupts the entire school.  This 
proposal should capture the most devastating cyberattackers, but im-
munize some single-incident attackers whose conduct is too similar to 
the common, albeit immature, give-and-take among adolescents.  
For students who engage in a pattern of repeated incidents of cy-
berattacking—what I will call cyberbullying—their creation of a hos-
tile educational environment for their victims parallels the behavior 
 
 12. Over time, the Court has carved out three exceptions to Tinker’s protection of stu-
dent speech.  In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court held that schools may pro-
hibit “offensively lewd and indecent speech.”  478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).  In Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court held that schools may regulate a student-produced 
newsletter where it bears the imprimatur of the school.  484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988).  And in 
Morse v. Frederick, the Court allowed schools to prohibit speech that encourages illegal drug 
use.  551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). 
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of common harassers.  Therefore, a cyberbully’s First Amendment de-
fense to school punishment should depend more on the interaction 
between free-speech rights and harassment than on the interaction 
between free speech and a single incident of aggression.  In this con-
text, the state has a compelling interest to protect victims bullied in 
schools for their sexual identity.  For these egregious cases, a First 
Amendment defense to discipline should fail. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II will argue that cyber-
bullying (and face-to-face bullying, for that matter) merits different 
treatment than single-incident cyberattacking.  Social scientists un-
animously agree that bullying depends on repeated conduct and have 
shown that bullying and cyberbullying can have more lasting and 
more serious short- and long-term effects than a single incident of cy-
berattacking.  Part III will lay out the First Amendment defense to 
school discipline for cyberbullying, suggesting that the argument has 
some intuitive appeal and warrants a rigorous response if punish-
ments for off-campus cyberbullying are to become readily available to 
educators.  Part IV will address the difference between cyberattackers 
and cyberbullies, arguing that they deserve different First Amend-
ment analyses and suggesting that a cyberbully is less likely to find so-
lace behind free speech rights than a cyberaggressor.  Part V will con-
clude with policy arguments justifying this new framework.  
II.  PROPERLY DEFINING THE PROBLEM OF CYBERBULLYING 
The evolution of bullying from the playground to cyberspace 
represents an insidious and growing problem for schools and adoles-
cents.  Cyberattacking and cyberbullying defy the ordinary rules of 
face-to-face aggression and are generally free of supervision, a natural 
palliative or ameliorative force in the schoolyard.13  It should come as 
no surprise then, that cyberattacking and cyberbullying can lead to 
poor academic performance, social maladjustment, and absenteeism, 
and can cause more lasting and severe effects, including depression, 
anxiety, and suicidal ideation.14
 
 13. M. Martinez-Dick & S. Landau, Cyberbullying: Individual Differences as Predictors 
of Children’s Harassment of Others 2 (2008), presented at the National Association of 
School Psychologists Annual Convention, New Oreleans, LA, available at 
http://psychology.illinoisstate.edu/selandau/Cyber%20NASP%202008.pdf. 
  Such effects, alongside a spate of re-
cent bullying and cyberbullying tragedies, are reason enough to con-
 14. See Nancy Willard, Educator’s Guide to Cyberbullying and Cyberthreats, CYBERBULLY.ORG 
5 (Apr. 2007), http://www.cyberbully.org/cyberbully/docs/cbcteducator.pdf (explaining 
that the harm—including low self-esteem, depression, school failure, and suicide—caused 
by cyberbullying may be even greater than harm caused by traditional bullying). 
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sider a legal response.  But while the legal academy is addressing the 
merits of those judicial and legislative responses,15
A.   Definitions and Distinguishing Characteristics of Cyberattacking and 
Cyberbullying 
 the current litera-
ture suffers from a lack of specificity as to what the problem actually is 
and where to direct those responses.  As I have described, there is a 
difference between single-incident cyberattacking and cyberbullying, 
both in their frequency and effects.  It makes sense, therefore, to dis-
tinguish single-incident cyberattacking from true cyberbullying for 
two reasons.  First, the distinction is faithful to the social science lite-
rature that unanimously requires repeated conduct in any bullying 
definition.  Second, some single-incident cyberattacking occurs so 
frequently that its inclusion under the cyberbullying umbrella would 
deflect attention, overwhelm any response, and give fodder to oppo-
nents of bullying regulation as over-inclusive and futile.  
Cyberattacking and cyberbullying merit different legal analyses in 
part because psychologists, educators, and other social scientists dis-
tinguish between the two in their scholarship.  The Journal of the Amer-
ican Medical Association defines bullying as “a specific type of aggres-
sion in which (1) the behavior is intended to harm or disturb, (2) the 
behavior occurs repeatedly over time, and (3) there is an imbalance 
of power, with a more powerful person or group attacking a less po-
werful one.”16  The asymmetry of power could be physical (that is, an 
athletic student versus a less-physically developed victim) or psycho-
logical (that is, high self-esteem versus low self-esteem).  The bullying 
can occur verbally (name-calling, threats, taunts, malicious teasing), 
physically (hitting, kicking, taking personal belongings), or psycho-
logically (spreading rumors, social exclusion).17  The Department of 
Justice adds that “bullying . . . involves a real or perceived imbalance 
of power, with the more powerful child or group attacking those who 
are less powerful.”18
 
 15. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 89 (2009) (ar-
guing that courts should combat cyberbullying with existing civil rights laws); Alison Vir-
ginia King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online Playground Safe for 
Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 874 (2010) (arguing for an “innovative, 
multidisciplinary approach” to tackle cyberbullying); Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Anti-
Gay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
  Physical injury from assaults and emotional in-
 16. Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among U.S. Youth: Prevalence and Association 
with Psychological Adjustment, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2094, 2094 (2001). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Warren J. Blumenfeld & R.M. Cooper, LGBT and Allied Youth Responses to Cyberbully-
ing: Policy Implications, 3 INT’L J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 114, 115 (2010) (quoting NELS 
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jury from direct insults and epithets may be the paradigmatic types of 
harm, but aggression is not limited to those injuries.  Psychological 
harm caused by repeated exclusion, for example, also fits under the 
bullying umbrella.19  This is called indirect bullying.20  What social 
scientists call cyberbullying is, like traditional or face-to-face bullying, 
the deliberate and repeated hostile behavior by a strong individual or 
group intended to harm a weaker individual or group.21  The distinc-
tion is in the media of harm, such as websites, email, chat rooms, mo-
bile phones, text messaging, and instant messaging.22
These broad definitions—generally accepted in some form or 
another in the social science literature
 
23 and in most states’ anti-
bullying statutes24—are notable for three reasons.25
 
ERICSON, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FACT SHEET NO. 27, ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF JUVENILE BULLYING 1 (2001), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200127.pdf). 
  First, for behavior 
 19. Id. at 119.  Perhaps the “Ugly Meter” iPhone application, which uses facial recogni-
tion software to tell someone how ugly he or she is, can be fodder for such bullying.  See 
Rosemary Black & Lindsay Goldwert, ‘Ugly Meter’ iPhone App May Be Hurtful to Kids and Fod-
der for Bullies, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 20, 2010, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
life-style/ugly-meter-iphone-app-hurtful-kids-fodder-bullies-article-1.190668. 
 20. Dan Olweus, Annotation: Bullying at School: Basic Facts and Effects of a School Based In-
tervention Program, 35 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1171, 1173 (1994). 
 21. See Blumenfeld & Cooper, supra note 18, at 118 (defining cyberbullying). 
 22. Id. at 119.  Blumenfeld and Cooper provide the following paradigmatic examples: 
(1) sending “Flame Mail” to a group to humiliate a victim (“She’s so ugly, so I sent out a 
flame mail to the entire school making fun of her acne”); (2) electronic hate mail; (3) tak-
ing a victim’s screen name and sending an embarrassing message under that name; (4) 
anonymous derogatory posts on blogs or social networking sites; (5) online polling pages 
to rate victims as “ugliest,” “biggest dyke,” or “most fem faggot”; (6) taking pictures of a 
victim in a state of undress and posting the picture to a social networking site; (7) creating 
websites to ridicule and mock others; (8) posting private material about a victim to a social 
networking site; (9) directly sending intimidating or threatening text messages or emails 
(“cyberstalking”); or (10) excluding victims from online communication with the group.  
Id. 
 23. A number of studies have suggested additions or subtractions to the definition.  
For example, Smith and Sharp have suggested that bullying must be unprovoked by the 
victim.  See Oyaziwo Aluede et al., A Review of the Extent, Nature, Characteristics and Effects of 
Bullying Behaviour in Schools, 35 J. INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL. 151, 152 (2008) (citing 
SCHOOL BULLYING: INSIGHTS AND PERSPECTIVES 9 (Peter K. Smith & Sonia Sharp eds., 
1994)). 
 24. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (2010) (defining bullying as “the repeated 
use by one or more students of a written, verbal or electronic expression or a physical act 
or gesture or any combination thereof, directed at a victim that: (i) causes physical or 
emotional harm to the victim or damage to the victim's property; (ii) places the victim in 
reasonable fear of harm to himself or of damage to his property; (iii) creates a hostile en-
vironment at school for the victim; (iv) infringes on the rights of the victim at school; or 
(v) materially and substantially disrupts the education process or the orderly operation of 
a school”). 
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to reach the level of bullying, it must be repeated.  This definition ex-
cludes single incidents. Requiring repeated behavior for bullying and 
cyberbullying makes sense for a variety of reasons.  When students are 
asked survey questions about “bullying” or “cyberbullying,” their res-
ponses almost unanimously assume repeated conduct.26  Further, if 
Nancy Willard, executive director of the Center for Safe and Respon-
sible Internet Use, is correct that cyberbullying is general “cruel[ty] to 
others by sending or posting harmful material or engaging in other 
forms of social aggression using the Internet or other digital technol-
ogies,”27
Capturing too much conduct under the bullying and cyberbully-
ing umbrellas does a disservice to the victims of real bullying.  Victims 
subjected to repeated physical, verbal, and psychological bullying, like 
Jamie Nabozny, for example, are qualitatively different than victims in 
cases like J.C., who face single-incident attacks.
 then it is difficult to imagine who among us is not a bully or 
cyberbully.  
28  Jamie, in contrast, 
was verbally, emotionally, and physically harassed for four years until 
he needed hospital stays to recover, attempted suicide, and switched 
schools.29  He was hit, spit on, victimized during a mock rape, at-
tacked from behind and urinated upon in a restroom, kicked by bul-
lies in the hallways, and constantly berated with homophobic epi-
thets.30
 
 25. Much of this discussion is taken from a forthcoming piece arguing that criminaliza-
tion of bullying and cyberbullying is unlikely to solve the bullying problem in schools.  See 
Waldman, supra note 
  Conversely, the victim in J.C. reported that she was 
15. 
 26. The breadth of cyberbullying research in this area is too vast to recite.  See, e.g., 
Blumenfeld & Cooper, supra note 18, at 128; SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, 
BULLYING BEYOND THE SCHOOLYARD: PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO CYBERBULLYING 
17–104 (2009); Waldman, supra note 15 (reporting the results of the first stage of the au-
thor’s own empirical research on bullying and cyberbullying in one San Diego high 
school). 
 27. Willard, supra note 14, at 1. 
 28. See J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 
2010) (involving a student who posted a YouTube video that criticized another student). 
 29. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451–52 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 30. Id.  In tenth grade, while studying in the library before school began, Jamie was 
attacked by a group of students.  Id. at 452.  One student kicked Jamie in the stomach for 
five or ten minutes while the others looked on laughing.  Id.  Weeks later, Jamie collapsed 
from internal bleeding as a result of the beating.  Id.  By the next year, Jamie left Ashland 
High School, enrolled in a school in Minneapolis and was ultimately diagnosed with Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder resulting from years of being bullied.  Id.  Perhaps the most 
tragic feature of Jamie’s story is the inexplicable refusal of any school official to do any-
thing about the harassment and their flagrant endorsement of the behavior.  See id. (after 
reporting the attack by the eight boys, the official in charge of discipline “laughed and told 
[Jamie] that [Jamie] deserved such treatment because he is gay”).  Jamie’s case suggests 
that holding school officials responsible for failure to stop bullying under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
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considering not going to school the day after an insulting video ap-
peared on YouTube.31
Second, the asymmetrical status of the victim and the aggressor is 
essential to categorizing the conduct as bullying.  At least two studies 
have suggested that the difference between aggression and the nor-
mal give-and-take of the schoolyard is the relationship between the 
parties—two high-status students tease each other, while a high-status 
student bullies a low-status student.
 
32  Low status can be based on any 
number of asymmetries, with physical strength representing only the 
most noticeable paradigm.  Minority status, for example, causes a sig-
nificant asymmetry in power, especially where the particular minority 
is the subject of ridicule, bigotry, and hatred outside the school.33  It 
should come as no surprise, then, that young members of the gay and 
lesbian community are uniquely susceptible to bullying and its tragic 
consequences.  They are bullied because they deviate from the 
norm;34 because their possible noncomformity to heterosexual social 
norms makes them different or set apart and, thus, easy targets; and 
because anti-gay bullying is either tacitly or explicitly condoned by an-
ti-gay bigotry in society at large.35
The third notable characteristic of the definition of bullying is 
that other than repetition, the other elements of the bullying defini-
tion—intent to harm and imbalance of power—are common to cy-
berbullies and cyberattackers.  Although cyberattacking and cyberbul-
lying can cause the same kind of effects, the repeated nature of 
 
 
is one possible legal recourse.  See id. at 453 (bringing a § 1983 claim against school admin-
istrators for failure to stop bullying).  That tactic is of limited use in many other bullying 
cases.  Waldman, supra note 15. 
 31. J.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (“[The victim] never testified that she feared any type 
of physical attack as a result of the video.  Instead, [she] felt embarrassed, her feelings 
were hurt, and she temporarily did not want to go to class.”). 
 32. See Ken Rigby & P.T. Slee, Children’s Attitudes Toward Victims, in UNDERSTANDING 
AND MANAGING BULLYING 119–35 (D.P. Tattum ed., 1993); Marilyn Langevin, Teasing and 
Bullying: Helping Children Deal with Teasing and Bullying: For Parents, Teachers, and Other 
Adults, INST. FOR STUTTERING TREATMENT & RESEARCH, http://www.stutterisa.org/ 
CDRomProject/teasing/tease_bully.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) (stating that a key 
element of bullying is a power imbalance). 
 33. For a good discussion of the unique effects of cyberharassment and cyberhate on 
minorities and women, see Citron, supra note 15, at 68–84. 
 34. See, e.g., Anthony R. D’Augelli et al., Childhood Gender Atypicality, Victimization, and 
PTSD Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth, 21 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 1462, 1477–
80 (2006). 
 35. See Waldman, supra note 15 (discussing the reasons why LGBT youth and those 
perceived to be gay are more susceptible to bullying and cyberbullying in schools); see also 
MARY ANNE GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 101–
05 (1991) (noting that silence from authority can teach society that bad behavior is ac-
ceptable). 
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bullying tends to amplify their gravity.  A single incident of aggression 
can cause significant harm,36 but, generally, victims of repeated bully-
ing tend to experience more serious negative outcomes, from with-
drawal from school activities37 and increased Internet use to the ex-
clusion of face-to-face interaction with others38 and depression.39
B.  Frequency of Cyberattacking Versus Cyberbullying 
  
Victims of cyberbullying more often report feelings of suicidal idea-
tion, suicide attempts, severe depression, anxiety that impacts daily 
activities, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).  
Another reason why cyberattacking and cyberbullying should re-
ceive different legal treatment is that some single-incident cyberat-
tacks are too common to merit a departure from free speech values.  
When assessing the frequency and effects of cyberbullying on their 
test subjects, social scientists distinguish between single incidents and 
repeated patterns.40  Their data show that supermajorities of certain 
student populations have experienced single-incident cyberattacking, 
but significantly fewer report the kind of negative effects that activists 
and legislators have said merit a strong state or legal response.41
High levels of Internet use among young people
  This 
suggests that if single-incident cyberattacking were crowded under the 
cyberbullying umbrella, there would be little conduct left outside the 
reach of anti-cyberbullying regulations. 
42
 
 36. See, e.g., Adrienne Nishina & Jaana Juvonen, Daily Reports of Witnessing and Experienc-
ing Peer Harassment in Middle School, 76 CHILD DEV. 435, 440–42, 446 (2005); Michele L. 
Ybarra et al., Examining Characteristics and Associated Distress Related to Internet Harassment: 
Findings From the Second Youth Internet Safety Survey, 118 PEDIATRICS 1169, 1173–75 (2006). 
 make cyberat-
tacking all too common.  According to a 2004 study conducted by i-
SAFE America, an Internet safety education foundation, 58 percent of 
 37. NANCY E. WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS: RESPONDING TO THE 
CHALLENGE OF ONLINE SOCIAL CRUELTY, THREATS, AND DISTRESS 27–56 (2006). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Susan M. Swearer et al., “You’re So Gay!”: Do Different Forms of Bullying Matter for Ado-
lescent Males?, 37 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 160, 170 (2008) (finding that adolescent gay males 
who frequently experience repeated bullying have increased rates of depression). 
 40. See Cyber Bullying: Statistics and Tips, I-SAFE AMERICA (June 28, 2004),  
http://www.isafe.org/channels/sub.php?ch=op&sub_id=media_cyber_bullying [hereinaf-
ter i-SAFE Survey] (differentiating between respondents who reported one incident of cy-
berattacking and those who reported repeated attacks). 
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 43–48. 
 42. A study conducted by UCLA found that in 2001 approximately 91 percent of 
twelve- to fifteen-year-olds and almost all sixteen- to eighteen-year-olds—99 percent—use 
the Internet on a regular basis.  Harlan Lebo, The UCLA Internet Report: Surveying the Digital 
Future: Year 3, 21 (2003), available at http://images.forbes.com/fdc/mediaresourcecenter 
/UCLA03.pdf.   
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students reported receiving hurtful or angry messages online, with 
more than 40 percent saying it has happened “more than once.”43  
Twenty-one percent of respondents received “mean” or “threatening” 
emails, while 53 percent admitted to sending hurtful messages over 
the Internet to someone else.  Of the latter group, more than one in 
three admitted to doing so “more than once.”  Thirty-five percent had 
been threatened online, with nearly one in five saying it happened 
“more than once.”  Finally, 42 percent reported being attacked online 
once, with one in four experiencing it “more than once.”44  In 2006, 
another survey found 9 percent of students reported being regularly 
harassed online.45  When students in another study were asked if they 
experienced cyberharassment at least once over a two-month period, 
25 percent of girls and 11 percent of boys responded affirmatively.46  
In 2008, a study conducted by UCLA found that nearly one-fifth of 
respondents (19 percent) experienced frequent online bullying in 
the past year, but more than three times as many experienced one in-
cident of online aggression.47  If state legislatures and schools applied 
their cyberbullying rules to all these students who experienced at least 
one incident of aggressive behavior online, resources would be 
stretched and cyberbullying would become the norm.48
An analysis of bullying and cyberbullying surveys of the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) community highlights the 
distinction between single-incident aggression and bullying even fur-
ther.
 
49
 
 43. I-SAFE Survey, supra note 
  Of those who participated in the Gay, Lesbian and Straight 
40. 
 44. Id. 
 45. JANIS WOLAK ET AL., ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER 10 
(2006), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf. 
 46. Andrew V. Beale & Kimberly R. Hall, Cyberbullying: What School Administrators (and 
Parents) Can Do, 81 THE CLEARING HOUSE 8, 8 (2007) (citing R.M. Kowalski & S. Limber, 
Cyberbullying Among Middle School Children (2005) (unpublished manuscript)). 
 47. Jaana Juvonen & Elisheva F. Gross, Extending the School Grounds?—Bullying Expe-
riences in Cyberspace, 78 J. SCH. HEALTH 496, 500 (2008).  Those who use instant messaging, 
webcams, and video chat technologies, such as AIM, iChat, and Skype, were about 1.5 to 
2.8 times as likely to be cyberbullied than those who did not use such communication 
tools.  Id. at 501.  Nearly 94 percent of adolescents, however, use those virtual communica-
tion technologies.  Id. at 500. 
 48. See infra note 60. 
 49. Like face-to-face bullying, cyberbullying is not limited to minorities.  However, gay 
and lesbian students, as well as those questioning their sexual orientation, are overrepre-
sented in student populations that experience both single-incident and frequent online 
harassment from fellow students.  See Waldman, supra note 15 (discussing the reasons why 
LGBT youth and those perceived to be gay are more susceptible to bullying and cyberbul-
lying in schools).  As a result of the LGBT community’s unique victimization in this area, 
studies focusing on this student population are particularly thorough and detailed. 
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Education Network’s (“GLSEN”) 2009 National School Climate Sur-
vey,50 88.9 percent reported hearing the word “gay” used in a negative 
way frequently or often, 72.4 percent reported hearing other homo-
phobic remarks (such as “dyke” or “faggot”) in school and online fre-
quently or often, and 84.6 percent said they were verbally harassed at 
least once (for example, called names or threatened with violence) 
because of their sexual orientation.51  More than 40 percent were 
physically harassed (that is, pushed, shoved or otherwise physically at-
tacked) at least once at school in the past year because of their sexual 
orientation, and nearly 53 percent were harassed or threatened via 
electronic media (for example, text messages, emails, instant messag-
es or postings on Facebook) at least once.52  Based on this research, 
and accounting for the increased victimization of LGBT students—
while the latest research suggests that 19 percent of all students expe-
rience repeated incidents of cyberbullying,53 31 percent of gay and 
lesbian students are victims of frequent online harassment—the 
number of LGBT students who experience single-incident cyberat-
tacking is exponentially higher than those who are cyberbullied.54
By broadening the term “bullying” to include all single incidents 
of aggression, we radically change the nature of the problem.  Using 
the data from the i-Safe Survey, there is a two-fold difference between 
victims of cyberbullying—just over one in four students—and victims 
of cyberattacking—over four in ten students.
 
55  Even that pales in 
comparison to the nearly nine in ten LGBT students who report ex-
periencing single incidents of aggression.56
 
 50. While most of this evidence refers to face-to-face or in-school bullying, it helps es-
tablish the difference between single-incident aggression and bullying, in general. 
  Including cyberattacking 
under the bullying umbrella minimizes the problems faced by those 
adolescents who cannot go online without being victimized.  Overex-
 51. Joseph G. Kosciw et al., Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network, The 2009 Nation-
al School Climate Survey: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in Our 
Nation’s Schools 16, 26 (2010) [hereinafter GLSEN Survey], available at 
http://glsen.org/binary-data/GLSEN_ATTACHMENTS/file/000/001/1675-2.pdf . 
 52. Id. at 26, 28.  Other rigorous studies confirm GLSEN’s findings.  In a survey of gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual students in New York schools, nearly 70 percent reported being ha-
rassed because of their sexual orientation or gender identity at least once.  Advocates for 
Children of N.Y., In Harm’s Way: A Survey of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Students 
Who Speak About Harassment and Discrimination in New York City Schools 4 (2005), available at 
http://www.advocatesforchildren.org/pubs/lgbt_report.pdf. 
 53. See Juvonen & Gross, supra note 47, at 500. 
 54. GLSEN Survey, supra note 51, at 28 (finding that 52.9 percent of LGBT students 
experienced isolated cyberattacks while 31 percent experienced frequent cyberattacks). 
 55. I-SAFE Survey, supra note 40. 
 56. GLSEN Survey, supra note 51, at 16. 
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tending bullying equates the aggressor in J.C.—who posted a single 
video criticizing another student57—with the aggressor in Nabozny, 
who tortured Jamie for being gay for four years until Jamie attempted 
suicide, switched schools, and developed PTSD.58
In addition, grouping all kinds of aggression together makes the 
problem universal, which has two consequences.  As a practical mat-
ter, it allows opponents with ulterior motives to criticize all bullying 
responses.  Focus on the Family and other anti-gay conservative 
groups, for example, oppose both state-sponsored and school-
directed anti-bullying programs because they believe the programs 
could lead to acceptance and tolerance of gays.
  
59 By focusing instead 
on the worst cases—repeated harassment and identity-based attacks—
anti-bullying advocates can effectively silence this irrationality.60
III.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT, CYBERATTACKING, AND CYBERBULLYING 
 
Fidelity to the social science literature,61
 
 57. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 as well as strategic and 
practical concerns about describing too much common conduct as 
cyberbullying, suggests that judges should treat cyberattacking and 
cyberbullying cases differently.  Normally, cases would progress as fol-
lows: Amelia creates her video that ridicules a classmate for failing to 
conform to sexual norms.  Zachary uses his website and a fake social 
networking profile to harass his victim over a period of time.  Both 
 58. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451–52 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 59. Eric Lach, Focus on the Family: Anti-Bullying Efforts Are a Gay Front, TPM (Aug. 31, 
2010, 9:59 AM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/08/focus_on_ 
the_family_dont_let_gay_activists_hijack.php; Robert Casey, Focus on the Family Stands Up 
for Bullying, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2010, 5:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
bob-casey/focus-on-the-family-stand_b_709651.html (discussing conservative opposition to 
legislation directed at addressing the problem of bullying in schools). 
 60. More significantly, regulating and policing conduct in which supermajorities of 
students engage creates a new norm instead of highlighting and condemning bad beha-
vior.  It would turn bullying into the jaywalking of school misbehavior.  Jaywalking is illegal 
in Manhattan, see N.Y.C., N.Y. RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. tit. 34, § 4-04(b)(2), (c) (2011), 
but on any given day, almost everyone working in Manhattan violates that rule and no one 
ever gets a ticket.  Occasionally, pedestrians do get tickets, but it is hardly the norm.  Rabbi 
Angry at NYPD over Jaywalking Ticket, CBS NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010, 10:30 PM), 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2010/11/29/rabbi-angry-at-nypd-over-jaywalking-ticket/.  
To paraphrase W.S. Gilbert, when everyone is a bully, then no one is.  W.S. Gilbert & Ar-
thur Sullivan, The Gondoliers act. II, in THE COMPLETE AND ANNOTATED GILBERT AND 
SULLIVAN 937 (Ian Bradley ed., 1996). 
 61. Some scholars argue that the psychological definition of bullying may not be ap-
propriate as a legal definition.  See Lyrissa Lidsky, Coming to Terms with Cyberbullying, 77 MO. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Lyrissa Lidsky, Criminalizing Cyberbullying and the Problem of Cy-
berOverbreadth, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 8, 2012, 8:37 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2012/02/cyberbullying-cyberlegislation-and-cyberoverbreadth.html. 
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victims inform their principal and report significant negative effects 
of the aggression.  After the principal suspends Amelia and Zachary 
for two weeks, they sue62 school officials63
I argue that Amelia’s First Amendment defense should be judged 
under the Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence.  Converse-
ly, Zachary’s First Amendment claim should be analyzed like a harass-
er’s free speech challenge.  After all, Zachary is creating a hostile en-
vironment for his victim by ridiculing him on the bases of sex and 
sexual nonconformity.  While there is far less precedent in this area, 
Zachary’s free speech claim should fail because his threatening con-
duct created a hostile educational environment for a captive au-
dience.
 for violation of their First 
Amendment rights in connection with the suspension.  
64
Before addressing the merits of either Amelia’s or Zachary’s free 
speech defenses, we must dispose of the plaintiffs’ likely threshold ar-
gument that school discipline is always inappropriate for conduct that 
takes place off-campus.  Schools that punish off-campus cyberattack-
ers and cyberbullies, the argument goes, violate the students’ free 
speech rights in two related ways: First, a school’s authority to discip-
line its students ends at the schoolhouse gate,
 
65
 
 62. Most likely, Amelia and Zachary would sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principal 
mechanism for seeking redress for an alleged deprivation of federal constitutional or sta-
tutory rights by state actors.  See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 978–79 (6th Cir. 
1984).  Raising a § 1983 claim has its own difficulties, full discussion of which is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  See Waldman, supra note 
 which takes the alle-
gedly offending behavior outside the ambit of student speech juri-
sprudence.  Second, the argument continues, cyberaggressive 
behavior should not be judged under Tinker and its progeny, but ra-
ther on the speech/action fulcrum that governs nonstudent speech.  
This argument aims to cut off school disciplinary authority at the 
threshold: if a campus presence is required, a school cannot punish 
15.  For background on litigation under 
§ 1983, see generally M. DAVID GELFAND, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ch. 6 (1984). 
 63. Section 1983 plaintiffs can also sue school districts in addition to school officials.  
This element of the hypothetical case is irrelevant for this Article’s First Amendment the-
sis. 
 64. See infra text accompanying notes 325–341. 
 65. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of Student Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing 
Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C. L. 
199, 221 (rejecting one commentator’s analysis because it “would allow school officials to 
punish students for off-campus conduct—an area beyond their jurisdiction”); Clay Calvert, 
Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 276 (2001) (describing a view that outside the classroom, 
children should be classified as citizens rather than students). 
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an off-campus cyberaggressor or cyberbully regardless of Tinker’s sub-
stantial disruption standard. 
This view seems reasonable at first.  In Tinker, the Court arguably 
used the on-campus/off-campus distinction as the basis for its finding 
that students enjoy fewer free-speech rights than members of society 
at large.66  And, in upholding school regulation of certain student 
speech in a subsequent case, the Court expressly advised that “[a] 
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 
basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor 
similar speech outside the school.”67  Various circuits have taken the geo-
graphic distinction to heart, finding student-written parodies created 
and distributed off campus68 and unofficial school newspapers distri-
buted off campus before and after school hours69 beyond the reach of 
school discipline,70 but finding them subject to school discipline 
where distribution took place on campus.71  The only exception to the 
rule is when the offending speech is offered at an off-campus event 
sponsored and supervised by the school.72
Though attractive, the campus presence argument should not 
serve as an a priori barrier to school discipline of cyberattacking or cy-
berbullying for three reasons.  First, a close reading of Tinker and its 
progeny suggests that the Supreme Court never intended to create a 
bright line between on-campus and off-campus speech.
  In these cases, the school’s 
aegis over the event creates a constructive schoolyard that extends the 
school’s disciplinary authority. 
73
 
 66. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”) (emphasis added). 
  Second, 
even if it did, the Internet’s ability to affect our physical spaces and its 
transcendent role in modern society and education makes that rule 
 67. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (emphasis added) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 69. Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 964 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 70. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004) (declin-
ing to find that student drawing done off campus could be regulated by school); Killion v. 
Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (“Although there is 
limited case law on the issue, courts considering speech that occurs off school grounds 
have concluded (relying on Supreme Court decisions) that school officials’ authority over 
off-campus expression is much more limited than expression on school grounds.”); Klein 
v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986) (enjoining suspension of a student 
who made a vulgar gesture to a teacher while off campus). 
 71. Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch. Ind. Sch. Dist., 822 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 72. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S 393, 400–01 (2007). 
 73. See infra Part III.A. 
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meaningless today.74  Third, even if a campus presence mattered, the 
suggestion that cyberattacking and cyberbullying are “mere speech” 
rather than action, thus deserving First Amendment protection, fails 
as a matter of theory and practice.75
A.  Campus Presence Requirement 
 
1.  The Supreme Court Has Never Required a Campus Presence for 
School Disciplinary Authority 
In its student speech cases, the Supreme Court has created one 
governing standard (Tinker) and carved out three limited exceptions, 
none of which requires a campus presence for school disciplinary au-
thority.76  In Tinker, the Court held that a school may regulate a stu-
dent’s expressive conduct if such expression causes or is reasonably 
likely to cause a material and substantial disruption to school activi-
ties.77  That case famously involved three students who were sus-
pended for wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Viet-
nam War in violation of school rules.  After the students challenged 
their suspension, the Court concluded that the school’s disciplinary 
action violated the students’ First Amendment rights because the pro-
test was “a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by 
any disorder or disturbance.”78  Conversely, school discipline would 
only be appropriate where the facts “reasonably [lead] school authori-
ties to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities” as a result of the student speech at issue.79
The Court decided three student speech cases after Tinker and, 
while it has yet to consider a case involving a First Amendment de-
fense to school punishment for cyberattacking or cyberbullying, the 
exceptions to Tinker all retained Tinker’s rejection of the campus 
presence requirement.  In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the 
Court carved out an exception to Tinker’s “material and substantial” 
disruption standard for lewd and “patently offensive” speech at a 
  Nothing 
in that standard requires a campus presence to create a reasonable 
fear of disruption. 
 
 74. See infra Part III.B. 
 75. See infra Part III.B. 
 76. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 403; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 
(1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 77. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 78. Id. at 508. 
 79. Id. at 514. 
 722 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:705 
school event.80  Such speech could be regulated by a school even ab-
sent any disruption.81  Fraser was a high school student who gave a 
speech nominating a fellow student for elective office during a school 
assembly.  The speech was an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual 
metaphor” about the candidate’s sexual prowess, filled with double 
entendres about male sexuality.82  The Court upheld Fraser’s suspen-
sion because a school has an obligation to teach the values, civility, 
and behavior that are “socially appropriate” and “essential to a demo-
cratic society.”83  So, while Fraser could have given his speech free of 
government interference outside the context of the “school environ-
ment,”84 the Court held that where a student engages in lewd, vulgar, 
or offensive speech, the school may regulate such speech as part of its 
duty to teach “essential lessons of civil, mature conduct,” even absent 
evidence of substantial disruption to the school.85
As in Tinker, nothing in this standard requires the speech to have 
taken place on campus.  Admittedly, Fraser gave his speech at a 
school assembly, on school grounds and during school hours; but the 
location and time of his speech were not essential to the Court’s justi-
fication for its holding.  The school’s disciplinary authority emanated 
from the school’s educational mission to teach its students “the 
shared values of a civilized social order,” not simply because the 
speech or event happened on campus.
  
86
The second exception to Tinker’s “material and substantial” dis-
ruption standard applies to school-sponsored speech, or speech that 
bears the official imprimatur of the school, and allows student offi-
cials great leeway in banning inappropriate student speech.  In Hazel-
  This suggests that the school 
could have disciplined Fraser even if the assembly took place in the 
Washington State Capitol’s legislative chamber on a class trip because 
Fraser recognized that the school’s educational mission extended 
beyond the boundaries of the campus. 
 
 80. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684–85. 
 81. Id. at 683.  Significantly, the Court noted that the record contained ample evidence 
of disruption.  Teachers testified at trial that some students reacted by laughing, others 
were shocked, and the youngest students were confused and awkward.  Id. at 683–84.  
These reactions, however, were not essential to the Court’s holding that the school could 
lawfully discipline Fraser.  Id. at 685.  
 82. Id. at 678.  The sexual nature of the speech made Chief Justice Burger so uncom-
fortable that he wrote his entire majority opinion without ever quoting the speech.  Justice 
Brennan filled that void at the beginning of his concurrence by quoting the entire speech.  
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. at 681 (majority opinion). 
 84. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 683 (majority opinion). 
 86. Id. 
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wood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court upheld a principal’s deci-
sion to remove two articles on teen pregnancy and divorce from the 
school’s newspaper.87  Distinguishing Tinker, the Court said that the 
two cases posed two different issues: Tinker concerned whether a 
school must tolerate student speech it does not like, but Kuhlmeier ad-
dressed whether the school must affirmatively promote student 
speech it believes does not comport with its educational mission.88  Af-
ter all, the newspaper was part of a journalism class and bore the emb-
lem of the school.89  As such, the Court held that “[e]ducators are en-
titled to exercise greater control over” speech that could reasonably 
be interpreted as endorsed by the school.90
The Kuhlmeier exception for school-sponsored speech has no 
more of a campus presence requirement than Tinker or Fraser.  Even if 
the students did their work at home and after school, as long as they 
published their work in a school-sponsored newspaper, school offi-
cials could exercise significant editorial control.
 
91
Finally, the Court’s third exception to Tinker’s analysis captures 
student speech that “is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug 
use.”
 
92  In Morse v. Frederick, a student attending the Olympic Torch 
Relay that passed on the street in front of his high school held a sign 
that the principal believed promoted the use of marijuana.93  The 
Court upheld the school’s suspension of that student because the stu-
dent was present at a school-sponsored viewing of the Relay, unfurled 
his banner so everyone at the school could see, and arguably pro-
moted conduct that the school had an interest in stopping.94  The 
Court based its holding not on where Frederick stood when he ex-
pressed his opinions (which was off campus), but on the school’s 
educational mission and its legitimate goal of not only stopping illegal 
drug use, but also to prevent anyone from using school time to pro-
mote it.95
 
 87. 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988). 
  Like Tinker and the exceptions created in Fraser and Kuhl-
meier, a campus presence is not required in Morse.  What is required is 
a student acting in a context in which he is acting qua student, that is, 
at an assembly, in a journalism class, or at a school-sponsored event.  
 88. Id. at 270–71. 
 89. Id. at 268. 
 90. Id. at 271. 
 91. Id. (stating that educators have authority over school-sponsored publications 
“whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting”). 
 92. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). 
 93. Id. at 397–98.  The sign read, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”  Id. at 397.  
 94. Id. at 397, 408. 
 95. Id. at 409–10.  
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2.  What Matters Is a Student Acting qua Student 
Although these cases are littered with references to the school-
house, the classroom, and other physical nexuses to the school, that is 
of no moment.  The evidence of a campus presence is arguably a sim-
ple heuristic for determining when the behavior at issue characterizes 
the student qua student, rather than student qua citizen, qua Little 
Leaguer, or any other persona not related to the school.  While most 
student speech analyses begin with Tinker’s oft-quoted premise that 
the “schoolhouse gate” does not extinguish student free speech 
rights, a close reading of these cases suggests that the Supreme Court 
is not speaking literally.  There is no physical gate delineating the 
boundaries of student speech; rather, it is shorthand for when a given 
adolescent is subject to school discipline and when he is not.  The 
evidence for this conclusion is twofold.  First, both the Court’s lan-
guage and substance suggests that its student speech cases were more 
about the relationship between the student and his education than 
about the geographic boundaries of a school campus. Second, whe-
rever it appears to rest its conclusions on location or school property, 
the Court follows with a reminder that the physical campus is just a 
symbol of or stands in for the educational mission.  
Students are “‘persons’ under our Constitution” in and out of 
school,96 but it is not the boundary of the school campus that distin-
guishes the extent of their rights.  It is the “school environment”97 
that plays that role.  Here, a school is defined by its mission—to teach 
and educate minors in the ways of civil society.98  That mission may 
extend beyond the classroom, as the Court held in Morse.99  The Court 
upheld the school’s disciplinary authority because school officials 
must be empowered “to safeguard those entrusted to their care,” re-
gardless of on which side of the campus boundary line the student 
held the sign.100
 
 96. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
  Similarly, in Fraser, where a student was suspended 
 97. Id. at 506. 
 98. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“The process of edu-
cating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, 
and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social 
order.  Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate 
the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and de-
portment in and out of class.  Inescapably, like parents, they are role models.”). 
 99. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
 100. Id.  Morse has come under fire from civil libertarians.  See, e.g., ACLU Slams Supreme 
Court Decision in Student Free Speech Case, ACLU (June 25, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/free-
speech/aclu-slams-supreme-court-decision-student-free-speech-case (quoting ACLU Na-
tional Legal Director Steven R. Shapiro as saying, “The Court’s ruling imposes new restric-
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for delivering a lewd student council nomination speech, Justice 
Brennan ignored the on-campus/off-campus distinction entirely, ad-
mitting that Fraser’s “speech may well have been protected had he 
given it in school but under different circumstances, where the school’s 
legitimate interests in teaching and maintaining civil public discourse 
were less weighty.”101
The Court’s student speech precedents are littered with refer-
ences to the schoolhouse and to officials’ authority being limited to 
“conduct in the schools.”
  
102  But, in most cases, the references to the 
four walls of the schoolhouse are cabined by the Court’s reminders 
that the school’s educational relationship to its students is salient.  In 
Tinker, the Court distinguished between speech inside and outside of 
the “schoolhouse gate,”103 but analyzed the students’ free speech 
rights in the context of students’ and teachers’ liberty interest in an 
education free of government intrusion and able to prepare the 
“young for citizenship.”104  Later in the opinion, Justice Fortas seemed 
to return to the school-centric focus when he stated that student 
rights embraced not only classroom hours, but also the cafeteria, the 
ball field, and any part of the “campus during the authorized 
hours.”105 He then reminded us that “[s]chool officials do not possess 
absolute authority over their students” irrespective of their physical 
location106 and what mattered was disruption to the educational mis-
sion.107  Similarly, in Fraser, the Court appeared to suggest that the is-
sue was what kind of speech was allowed “in the classroom or in 
school assembly,”108
 
tions on student speech rights and creates a drug exception to the First Amendment.”).  It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to either join the chorus of that criticism or defend the 
Court’s analysis.   
 but then clarified that Fraser’s vulgar speech 
could be limited not because of where he spoke, but because a school 
has an interest in protecting minors from his arguably lewd com-
 101. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 102. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507.  See also id. at 511 
(“state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism”); id. at 512–13 (referring 
to students’ rights “in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the 
authorized hours”); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (“A high school assembly or classroom is no 
place for a sexually explicit monologue . . . .”). 
 103. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 104. Id. at 507 (quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
 105. Id. at 512–13. 
 106. Id. at 511. 
 107. Id. at 513. 
 108. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“The determination 
of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly 
rests with the school board.”). 
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ments.109  A similar analysis held sway in Kuhlmeier.  In that case, offi-
cials were permitted to censor two articles in the school newspaper 
not because students created and distributed the newspaper on cam-
pus, but only because the paper was part of the pedagogical mission 
of a journalism class, bore the imprimatur of the school, and the cen-
sorship was “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns.”110
If a campus presence was essential to lawful school discipline, all 
an aggressor would have to do to avoid punishment is take his beha-
vior just outside the gate.  This reality has moved most courts to ig-
nore the on-campus/off-campus dichotomy and assess off-campus 
student speech based on its on-campus effects.
  The fulcrum upon which the merits of the First Amend-
ment defenses were decided, therefore, was the relationship of the 
school to the student qua student. 
111  But, if location is 
not a valid distinction for determining the lawfulness of school discip-
line, what may have animated the decisions of those jurisdictions that 
honor the dichotomy are the different relationships between the 
school and the students involved (where a student acts qua student), 
for which an on-campus or off-campus location is a simple heuristic.  
In Thomas v. Board of Education, for example, students could not be 
punished for creating and distributing off campus a magazine in-
spired by National Lampoon.112
 
 109. Id. at 684–85.  Compare id. at 685 (“The First Amendment does not prevent the 
school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respon-
dent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”) (emphasis added), with id. 
(“A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed 
towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.”) (emphasis added).  This language sug-
gests that the important factors are the audience and the educational mission.  The loca-
tion is relevant to, but not determinative of, the Court’s analysis. 
  Nor could the students in Shanley v. 
Northeast Independent School District be punished for creating and distri-
 110. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268, 271–73 (1988). 
 111. Refusing to differentiate between student speech taking place on-campus and 
speech taking place off-campus, a number of courts have applied the test in Tinker when 
analyzing off-campus speech brought onto the school campus.  See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. 
Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 827–28 (7th Cir. 1998) (student disciplined for an article printed in an 
underground newspaper that was distributed on school campus); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. 
Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (student expelled for poem composed off-campus 
and brought onto campus by the student); Sullivan v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 
1071, 1075–77 (5th Cir. 1973) (student punished for authoring article printed in under-
ground newspaper distributed off campus, but near school grounds); Killion v. Franklin 
Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (student disciplined for 
composing degrading top-ten list distributed via email to school friends, who then brought 
it onto campus; author had been disciplined before for bringing top-ten lists onto cam-
pus); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089–90 (W.D. Wash. 2000) 
(applying Tinker to mock obituary website constructed off campus). 
 112. 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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buting a so-called “underground” newspaper.113
3.  Most Lower Courts That Have Addressed the Issue Agree That the 
Supreme Court Has Never Required a Campus Presence 
  In these paradigmat-
ic cases, the publications’ creators may have been students, but they 
were not acting qua students when they wrote parodies or opinion 
pieces on contemporary political topics.  They were humorists and po-
litical activists, identities not connected to the youth’s membership in 
the school community.  The on-campus/off-campus distinction may 
simply have been easy shorthand for determining when students ex-
press themselves qua students and when they express themselves qua 
citizens. 
The Supreme Court has never had occasion to address a school’s 
disciplinary authority over off-campus cyberattacking and cyberbully-
ing.  I have interpreted the Court’s precedents to mean the Court’s 
school speech cases apply regardless of any off-campus origin, and 
most lower courts, some of which have been confronted with cyberat-
tacking cases, agree.114
Some circuits apply Tinker without considering where the speech 
originated. In LaVine v. Blaine School District, for example, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld a school’s authority to expel a student who wrote a 
graphic and violent poem about killing his classmates.
 
115  He wrote his 
poem off campus, after school hours and not as part of any school-
related activity, but he brought the poem to school on his own.116   He 
showed his work to a teacher, who took the poem to a school counse-
lor, who in turn set up a meeting with the vice principal.117  The stu-
dent was expelled as a result.118  Without regard to the off-campus 
origin of the poem, the Ninth Circuit determined that the poem fell 
under Tinker and not under any of the Supreme Court’s exceptions to 
its “material and substantial” disruption standard.119  After all, neither 
Fraser nor Kuhlmeier applied because the poem was not vulgar, lewd, or 
obscene, and the poem was not part of any school-sponsored event.120
 
 113. 462 F.2d 960, 964, 975 (5th Cir. 1972). 
  
 114. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 115. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 990. 
 116. Id. at 983. 
 117. Id. at 984. 
 118. Id. at 986. 
 119. Id. at 989–92. 
 120. Id. at 988–89.  The rule that Tinker applies to all student speech that does not fit 
within the Fraser,  Kuhlmeier, or Morse exceptions is a reasonable reading of Supreme Court 
precedents and was established in the Ninth Circuit in Chandler v. McMinnville School Dis-
trict, 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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The court upheld the school’s authority to expel the student because 
of a reasonable fear that a poem about killing a classmate would dis-
rupt the school.121
The LaVine analysis is common in other jurisdictions.  In Shanley, 
for example, the Fifth Circuit applied Tinker to an underground 
newspaper that students created and distributed off campus, but 
where a few copies showed up on campus.
 
122  And in Boucher v. School 
Board, the Seventh Circuit upheld discipline for a student who wrote 
an article off campus which appeared in an underground newspaper 
that was distributed on campus.123  In these and other cases, courts 
have gone straight to applying Tinker’s substantial disruption standard 
to determine the merit of a First Amendment defense to a school’s 
disciplinary authority.  They all ignored the lack of a campus pres-
ence.  In O.Z. v. Board of Trustees, the district court stated explicitly 
that “the fact that Plaintiff’s creation and transmission of the [speech] 
occurred away from school property does not necessarily insulate her 
from school discipline.”124  After all, the mere fact that the student’s 
conduct took place off campus does not mean that it cannot “create a 
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption” in the school environ-
ment.125
In many student Internet speech cases, courts have taken an ex-
tra step before reaching the Tinker test.  For Tinker to apply, the origin 
of the speech is part of a threshold question: there must be a connec-
tion, or nexus, between the speech and the school, and the off-
 
 
 121. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 992. 
 122. Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 964, 970–71 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 123. 134 F.3d 821, 822, 824, 827–28 (7th Cir. 1998).  See also Killion v. Franklin Reg’l 
Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448–49, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (applying Tinker where stu-
dent was disciplined for composing degrading top-ten list and distributing it off campus to 
friends via email, and where one recipient brought the list to campus); Emmett v. Kent 
Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (applying Tinker to a web-
site created by a student off campus that contained mock obituaries of classmates); Beus-
sink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177–78, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (ap-
plying Tinker to a website created by a student off campus that contained criticism of 
school authorities, when another student accessed the website at school and showed it to a 
teacher); O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs., No. CV 08-5671, 2008 WL 4396895, at *1, *3–4 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 9, 2008) (applying Tinker to uphold a suspension where a student created a video off 
campus during spring break that depicted a graphic dramatization of a teacher’s murder 
and then posted the video on the Internet); Pangle v. Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275, 
277, 285–87 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (applying Tinker to an underground newsletter distri-
buted on campus). 
 124. O.Z., 2008 WL 4396895, at *4. 
 125. Id.; see also Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (holding that the court need not consider 
plaintiff’s argument that a heightened standard applies to speech occurring off school 
grounds because “[t]he overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed student speech 
(whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tinker”). 
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campus origin of the speech is one factor that weighs against a finding 
of a sufficient nexus.  This is simply another way of determining if the 
student was acting qua student, or as someone independent of the 
school community.  
For example, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education, a student 
created, for his online profile, an AIM126 icon of a gun firing at a 
man’s head with red dots of “blood.”127  Beneath the icon, the student 
wrote “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” referring to the student’s English 
teacher.128  Another student showed a copy of the icon to the teacher, 
who then brought it to the school’s principal.129 The court asked 
whether anything created off campus could foreseeably “reach the 
school property” and whether the evidence showing that it did even 
mattered.130  In Doninger v. Niehoff, a student sent an email to her 
peers and their parents and posted comments to her blog criticizing 
school officials for canceling a school event.  She implored her peers 
to contact school officials and complain.131  The message’s purpose, 
then, was to have the criticism reach campus, thus bringing the 
speech under Tinker.132
Most recently, in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, the Fourth 
Circuit upheld a school’s discipline of a student for engaging in off-
campus cyberattacking of another student, in part, because there was 
a sufficient connection between the conduct and the school.
  
133  A stu-
dent had created a MySpace discussion group called “S.A.S.H.,” which 
stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes,” referring to a fellow stu-
dent, Shay N.134
 
 126. AIM refers to AOL Instant Messenger, an instant messaging service run by America 
Online.  AOL INSTANT MESSENGER, http://www.aim.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
  The cyberattacker may have “pushed her computer’s 
keys in her home, but she knew that the electronic response would 
be, as it in fact was, published beyond her home” and would reach 
 127. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 128. Id. at 36. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at 39.  The panel was divided over whether it must first assess the foreseeabil-
ity that the student’s speech would reach school authorities.  The panel declined to decide 
if such a determination was necessary because it agreed that it was reasonably foreseeable 
the icon would reach the school.  Id.  
 131. 527 F.3d 41, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that Tinker was satisfied because it was 
clear from the purpose of the message that it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech 
would reach the school and cause a material and substantial disruption). 
 132. Id. at 50–52. 
 133. 652 F.3d 565, 577 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[W]here such speech has a sufficient nexus 
with the school, the Constitution is not written to hinder school administrators’ good faith 
efforts to address the [bullying] problem.”). 
 134. Id. at 567. 
 730 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:705 
and disrupt the school.135  The attacks came from students in her high 
school, were directed at a fellow student, and occurred in a group 
called “Students Against Sluts Herpes,” thus indicating a strong school 
connection.136
In each of these cases, off-campus speech was ultimately sub-
jected to the school’s disciplinary authority because of the nexus be-
tween the speech and the school’s educational environment and mis-
sion, not merely a connection to the school’s geographic boundaries.  
The absence of this nexus also explains why a school could not discip-
line the student in Mahaffey v. Aldrich.
 
137  In that case, a student 
created a website directing his readers to select any person and to kill 
in a particularly gruesome manner described in detail on the web-
site.138  The district court found no evidence of any connection be-
tween the website and the school, particularly because the student’s 
calls for violence were generic, independent of the school communi-
ty, and too general to be reasonably directed at any particular mem-
ber of the school.139
The Third Circuit’s recent en banc decision in Layshock v. Hermi-
tage School District
  As such, in cases where a school could punish an 
online aggressor and even in cases where schools could not, the geo-
graphic origin and geographic reach of the speech is irrelevant.  
When the speech originated on campus, the nexus to the school is 
obvious; when the speech originated off campus, the nexus is estab-
lished by reference to the subject of the speech, the intent of the 
speaker, the intended audience, and other factors.  These factors es-
tablish that the speaker was acting qua student, rather than just a 
member of the community at large.  That critical comments origi-
nated off campus was never an a priori barrier to a school’s discipli-
nary authority. 
140 does not complicate or challenge this theory.  In 
that case, the court rejected a school’s authority to discipline a stu-
dent for creating an online parody of the school’s principal, but it did 
so not because there was an insufficient nexus—the school admitted 
that there was no nexus and no effect on the school environment.141
 
 135. Id. at 573. 
  
The school conceded Tinker’s relevance at oral argument and, in-
stead, attempted to justify its discipline under Fraser’s lewdness excep-
 136. Id. 
 137. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 138. Id. at 781–82. 
 139. Id. at 784–86. 
 140. 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 141. Id. at 207, 214. 
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tion to Tinker.142  That argument had no legs to stand on; Fraser in-
volved lewd speech at a school-sponsored assembly and thus impli-
cated speech that could reasonably be assumed to bear the school’s 
approval.143
4.  The Internet’s Role in Society and Education Makes Any Campus 
Presence Requirement Antiquated 
 
So far, I have argued that none of the Supreme Court’s student-
speech cases were based on an on-campus/off-campus distinction and 
that most courts that have interpreted those precedents agree.  Even 
if that were not the case, a bright-line geographic distinction no long-
er makes sense.  The distinction falls apart when confronted by the 
effects the Internet can have on our physical world and by the Inter-
net’s essential role in modern education.  Even if a campus presence 
used to be required for lawful school discipline of student speech, 
that requirement should be dropped given the emergence and 
growth of the Internet as a social and educational tool. 
Indeed, several courts and scholars have already commented on 
the pervasiveness of computer and Internet use in our daily lives, a 
conclusion based on incontrovertible data.144 Studies show that the 
Internet and other cyber and digital technologies have replaced tradi-
tional media in everything from entertainment145 and advertising146 to 
buying coffee147 and socializing.148
 
 142. See id. at 219.  At oral argument, the school district conceded that it was “relying 
solely on the fact that Justin created the profile of Trosch, and not arguing that it created 
any substantial disruption in the school.”  Id.   
  This is because the popularity of 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 80–86. 
 144. See, e.g., People v. Rocco, 766 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (noting that it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct business in contemporary society without 
the use of or access to a computer); Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and Democratic Legi-
timacy, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 205, 211 (2010) (discussing the “global impact” of the Internet). 
 145. See, e.g., Chris Albrecht, More People Watching TV Shows Online, GIGAOM (Oct. 15, 
2007, 12:37 PM), http://gigaom.com/video/more-people-watching-tv-shows-online/ (not-
ing that research by the Conference Board Consumer Research Center has found that the 
number of people who watch television online has increased since 2006 and is likely to 
continue growing). 
 146. See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Google’s Ad Targeting Goes Behavioral, S.F. GATE (Mar. 11, 
2009, 11:50 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/techchron/detail? blo-
gid=19&entry_id=36840 (discussing Google’s plans to implement user-specific advertising 
based on Internet usage). 
 147. See Molly McHugh, How to Buy Starbucks Coffee with Your iPhone, DIGITAL TRENDS 
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/how-to-buy-starbucks-coffee-with-
your-iphone/ (discussing Starbucks’s app allowing users to pay for coffee with their smart-
phones). 
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the computer and the Internet has increased to pervasive levels in the 
last ten years.  In 2008, the population of the United States was over 
303 million and over 220 million Americans (72.6 percent) were on-
line.149
In part because the Internet has come to pervade our daily lives, 
it has taken on an increasingly salient role in education.  Secondary 
school teachers have integrated digital technologies into their class-
rooms through email exchanges,
 
150 speaking with and learning from 
students in other countries,151 and accessing research tools,152 for ex-
ample.  There are countless websites aimed at further integrating the 
Internet into the classroom153 and all levels of government are work-
ing with outside donors to provide computers and Internet access to 
public schools.154  All of these programs encourage both the integra-
tion of the Internet into the classroom and the use of the Internet as 
an educational tool at home.  If it ever was, the “school environment,” 
to use Justice Fortas’s term in Tinker,155
This is not a radical argument. Professor Mary Anne Franks ar-
gues that since our pervasive online presence allows “sexual harass-
ment in one setting [that] produce[s] harms in another,”
 is no longer defined by the 
four walls of the classroom.  It extends as far as the Internet tools it 
deploys to teach students how to add and subtract, read and write, 
think and grow. 
156
 
 148. Facebook, for example, has more than 800 million active users, and more than 50 
percent of those users log on to Facebook on any given day.  Statistics, People on Face-
book, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Nov. 5, 
2011). 
 tradition-
al sexual harassment law that has so far protected victimized women 
 149. United States of America Internet Usage and Broadband Usage Report, INTERNET WORLD 
STATS: USAGE AND POPULATION STATISTICS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/ 
us.htm (last updated Feb. 14, 2011). 
 150. Pamela U. Silva et al., E-mail: Real-life Classroom Experiences with Foreign Languages, 23 
LEARNING & LEADING TECH. 10, 10–12 (1996). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Chris Davis, The I-Search Paper Goes Global: Using the Internet as a Research Tool, 84 
ENG. J. 27, 27–33 (1995). 
 153. See, e.g., INTERNET 4 CLASSROOMS, http://www.internet4classrooms.com/intro-
ducing_i4c.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (stating that the website is designed to assist 
teachers in locating teaching resources on the Internet). 
 154. See Press Release, The White House, White House to Launch “Digital Promise” In-
itiative (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/white-
house-launch-digital-promise-initiative (discussing initiative funded by the Department of 
Education, Carnegie Corporation, and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation to increase 
access to technology in schools). 
 155. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 156. Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657 (2012). 
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in “single, protected settings” like the workplace under Title VII, the 
school under Title IX, and, to some extent, at home and in prison,157 
inadequately captures what modern sex harassment looks like.  Pro-
fessor Franks argues persuasively for a multiple-setting conception of 
sexual harassment, because cyberharassment can have just as delete-
rious an effect on a victim’s ability to function in the workplace as tra-
ditional forms of workplace harassment.158  This is true of any kind of 
cyberharassment, which can have the same kind of harmful effect on 
a victim’s ability to function in the physical world.  Whether a peer 
uses his or his victim’s Facebook page to make derogatory comments 
questioning the victim’s sexuality, or uses Instagram to post altered 
graphic photos depicting the victim in compromising situations, or 
takes to Twitter to call a young girl a “dyke,” these attacks can cause 
even the strongest student to fear further humiliation, lose interest in 
attending school, and close herself off from a world she feels is in-
creasingly hostile.  She becomes unable to learn, participate in extra-
curricular activities, or participate in school society.  Her educational 
rights have been denied her, which can constitute a civil rights viola-
tion,159
5.  Replacing the Campus Presence Requirement 
 regardless of where her victimization occurred. 
The circuits are not really of two minds when it comes to the 
threshold on-campus/off-campus distinction.  For jurisdictions like 
the Ninth Circuit that have always considered the locus of origin irre-
levant, a campus presence was never required, and this view is the best 
interpretation of Tinker and its progeny.160
The Second Circuit’s search for a nexus may represent an extra 
step,
  
161
 
 157. Id. at 659. 
 but the result will be the same.  The role of the Internet in 
modern education and the very real effects a fellow student’s cyber-
bullying has on a victim’s ability to learn inside the school means that 
any off-campus origin of cyberbullying should be no barrier to a 
school’s disciplinary authority.  The circuit court’s use of campus 
presence evidence may just be a shorthand way of determining if the 
 158. See id. (arguing that “sexual harassment in cyberspace produces harm that is equal 
to or more severe than sexual harassment that occurs in traditionally protected spaces”). 
 159. See Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action: The Court’s Expanded 
Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally Funded Programs, 67 MD. L. 
REV. 358, 376–77 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Monroe Coun-
ty, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), that in certain circumstances a school can be liable for indiffe-
rence to student-on-student sexual harassment). 
 160. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 127–132. 
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aggressing student is acting qua student.  To their credit, no court to 
follow the Second Circuit’s reasoning has ever found the off-campus 
origin determinative.  In Thomas, for example, students who created 
an independent, nonschool-sponsored magazine modeled after the 
National Lampoon could not be punished for its sexual content not 
because the magazine was created off campus,162 but rather because 
the students “deliberately designed” all activities to take place off 
campus, made every effort to make sure copies never showed up on 
campus, and made no mention of their peers, teachers, or school 
community.163
If my theory is correct that what matters for school disciplinary 
authority has always been students acting qua students, then neither 
the Ninth nor the Second Circuit needs to change the way it deter-
mines the threshold question of whether that authority exists for cy-
beraggression.  The on-campus/off-campus distinction is, at a mini-
mum, antiquated.  To determine when an adolescent is acting as a 
student of the “school environment,” even the Second Circuit does 
not simply look at the geographic origin of the speech.  Instead, it 
looks to the relationship between the speaker and the school.
  The students were not just expressing themselves off 
campus, they were divorcing their expression from the school context 
in its entirety.  They were not acting qua students.  This purposeful 
lack of any connection to the school made Thomas a non-student 
speech case, and thus out of the school’s disciplinary reach.  
164
In cyberattacking and cyberbullying cases, the school nexus 
should similarly be determined by the relationship between the ag-
gressor and his victim.  Peer-to-peer cyberattacking and cyberbullying 
cases involve an aggressor targeting a victim he knows from school.  
The cyberexpression would not exist but for their attendance at the 
same school.
  
165
This theory has a number of advantages.  First, it bridges the ap-
parent circuit divide about the role of the geographic origin of the 
  If a student attacks a victim he knows only because he 
is a student at his school, then he is acting as a member of the school 
community.  This stands in contrast to an adolescent who attacks a 
victim he knows from family or church; in those cases, the aggressor is 
acting as a member of an entirely different community. 
 
 162. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 163. Id. at 1050.  Some activity related to the magazine did take place at school; howev-
er, the court found that such activity was de minimis.  Id. 
 164. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 165. See, e.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (“Impor-
tantly, the web site was aimed not at a random audience, but at the specific audience of 
students and others connected with this particular School District . . . .”). 
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speech.166  The Ninth Circuit ignores where the speech originated be-
cause Supreme Court precedents make the on-campus/off-campus 
distinction irrelevant and because speech that originates off campus 
can still have a substantial effect on the school environment.167  Con-
versely, the Second Circuit looks to the relationship between the off-
campus speaker and the school to determine if it is reasonably fore-
seeable that the off-campus speech would reach campus.168
Second, the relationship test avoids the difficulties associated 
with a campus presence requirement in the Internet age.  The perva-
siveness of the Internet in daily life and in education makes it over-
whelmingly likely that any type of cyberexpression aimed at the school 
community will find its way to campus.  And, as Professor Franks has 
argued in the workplace context, no longer can we assume that the 
locus of the harassment will always be the locus of its effects.  The In-
ternet age makes that assumption antiquated.
  When the 
speaker and target are part of the same school community, and espe-
cially when the speech occurs over the Internet or other digital tech-
nologies, it is reasonable to expect the speech to reach campus, thus 
obviating the need for the Second Circuit’s threshold question. 
169  Third, the relation-
ship test uses a principle that has a solid foundation in other areas of 
law.  In contract law, fiduciary duties are established by particular re-
lationships between parties;170 at common law, the relationship be-
tween parties determines whether a hired party was an employee;171 
and, in negligence actions, the existence of a duty of care hinged on 
the relationship between the parties involved;172
 
 166. See supra Part III.A.3 (describing the different approaches of the Ninth and Second 
circuits). 
 to name just a few 
examples.  
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 115–121. 
 168. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007); Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 169. See Franks, supra note 156, at 659 (“The multiple-setting conception advocated by 
this Article recognizes that the action and the effect of sexual harassment can be split, an 
increasingly common reality in the Internet age.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (noting the “estab-
lished doctrine that [a fiduciary] duty arises from a specific relationship between two par-
ties”). 
 171. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) 
(“‘Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship be-
tween the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to 
the hired party . . . .’” (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
751–52 (1989))). 
 172. See, e.g., Hoidas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 09 C 7409, 2010 WL 1790864, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2010) (“The law of agency does not impute a duty that the principal 
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But, the student acting qua student, as evidenced by the relation-
ship between the aggressor and his victim, is not determinative of a 
school’s authority to punish him for cyberattacking.  It answers a thre-
shold question of whether a bad actor could be punished by his 
school for conduct done outside of school and online.  Once this 
threshold is crossed, a court’s analysis of the merit of a free speech 
defense to that punishment should depend on the nature of the con-
duct at issue, that is, the difference between single-incident cyberat-
tacking and repeated cyberbullying. 
B.  Speech/Action Distinction on the Internet 
It should now be clear that the off-campus origin of cyberattack-
ing and cyberbullying should not be an a priori barrier to a school’s 
disciplinary authority.  In the Internet age, regulating student speech 
based on the location of its origin, dissemination, or access ignores 
the sea change that cyberspace has brought to modern life and educa-
tion.  But, even if that were not the case—if a geographic definition 
were possible and reflected the Supreme Court’s intentions in Tinker, 
Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse—suggesting that student cyberattacking, 
cyberbullying, and cyberexpression generally is pure speech, with no 
element of action, should not raise a second barrier to a school’s dis-
ciplinary authority.  The speech/action distinction may pepper First 
Amendment scholarship, but these categories are “elusive” and un-
helpful.173
The notion that the First Amendment protects speech, not ac-
tion,
   
174 is a common element to much free speech rhetoric, but it is 
the beginning of any analysis, not the end.  The distinction, in part, 
arguably explains the difference between cases like Cohen v. Califor-
nia,175 where the Court reversed a conviction for entering a court-
house wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the 
Draft,”176
 
owes to a third party onto an agent.  Instead, the duty of care flows from the relationship 
between the parties.”) (citations omitted). 
 and United States v. O’Brien, where the Court upheld the 
 173. Citron, supra note 15, at 100. 
 174. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 209 (2d ed. 
1996) (discussing how the Supreme Court has vacillated on the speech/conduct distinc-
tion). 
 175. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 176. Id. at 16–17, 26 (“‘The defendant did not engage in, nor threaten to engage in, 
nor did anyone as the result of his conduct in fact commit or threaten to commit any act 
of violence.’” (quoting People v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. (1969), 
rev’d sub nom. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971))). 
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prosecution of a protestor who burned his selective service card.177  
The First Amendment protects expression, not the “noncommunica-
tive” element of burning a government document.178
Even assuming this distinction has merit as a governing principle 
of free-speech law,
 
179 the speech/action distinction is obscure in al-
most every context and especially with respect to the Internet.180  As 
Professor Danielle Keats Citron has argued, the Internet both aggre-
gates words into action—for example, “hacking and denial of service 
attacks [] are accomplished by sending communications to other 
computers”181—and disaggregates communications into components 
that operate as actions, as with online sexual harassers who refuse to 
leave cues to mitigate the victim’s fear.182  In other words, a threat that 
arrives anonymously and without any indication of a joking tone “en-
gender[s] serious fear that . . . [the threat] will be carried out of-
fline.”183  The absence of these cues evidences an intent to “terrorize 
the victim,” which can “convert [online] expression into criminal 
conduct.”184
To suggest, then, that cyberattacking and cyberbullying are ex-
amples of pure speech, meriting greater First Amendment protection, 
is a losing argument.  A Facebook page that is created solely to terror-
ize a student or an online polling page created to rate the attractive-
ness of a victim may be communicated from one computer to anoth-
er, but they are no more examples of pure speech than face-to-face 
threats, intimidation, and harassment.  In any event, the inquiry into 
the merit of a free speech defense does not end with categorizing giv-
en behavior as speech.  Even in the context of political speech, where 
 
 
 177. 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968) (“[T]he governmental interest . . . [is] limited to the 
noncommunicative aspect of O’Brien’s conduct.”). 
 178. See id. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of 
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends 
thereby to express an idea.”). 
 179. But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 829–30 (2d ed. 
1988). Professor Tribe has criticized the speech/action distinction as lacking analytical 
substance and being impossible for any court to define. See also Frederick M. Lawrence, 
Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist 
Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 692–93 (1993) (discussing the limitations of the 
speech/action distinction). 
 180. Citron, supra note 15, at 100 n.281. 
 181. Id. at 99. 
 182. Id. at 100. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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First Amendment protections are at their “zenith,”185
IV.   ANALYZING FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSES TO SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 
FOR CYBERATTACKING AND CYBERBULLYING—TWO WAYS FORWARD 
 such speech can 
be regulated or curtailed for any number of reasons.  
At this point, both Amelia’s and Zachary’s threshold objection to 
school discipline has failed.  Regardless of the off-campus origin of 
their speech and other conduct, a school can still discipline them as 
members of the school community, as students qua students who 
chose their victims because of their school connection.  Now, the cas-
es can proceed to the merits of their First Amendment defenses.  For 
Amelia, her future lies with the Court’s student speech cases; for Za-
chary, his fate lies with the harassment model. 
Three factors suggest that we need distinct and more construc-
tive ways to determine the merit of free speech defenses to punish-
ment for cyberattacking and cyberbullying: the differences between 
single-incident cyberattacking and repeated cyberbullying,186 the tran-
scendent roles played by the Internet in our daily lives and in our 
schools,187 and the inadequacy of the on-campus/off-campus and 
speech/action distinctions188 as governing First Amendment prin-
ciples.  This Article aims to fill that void.  I propose two answers for 
two different problems.  First, I suggest that whether a school’s discip-
linary authority over identity-based, single-incident cyberattacking 
impinges on a student’s First Amendment rights should be governed 
by the consistent rationale underlying all of the Court’s student 
speech cases—namely, a narrowly defined effects test that balances 
student expression against the school’s ability to teach its students 
successfully.  As I argue elsewhere, Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse 
may use different standards for restricting different types of student 
speech; but, in each case, the Court is concerned with the same thing: 
the effects of given student expression on the school’s ability to 
teach.189  Tinker accepts the connection between impingements on the 
rights of students and educational disruption,190
 
 185. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22, 425 (1988). 
 and the individual, 
 186. See supra Part II. 
 187. See supra Part III.A.4. 
 188. See supra notes 179–185. 
 189. See Ari Ezra Waldman, And All Those Like You: Identity-Based Aggression and Student 
Speech, A New Way Forward, 77 MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Waldman, And 
All Those Like You]. 
 190. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (“Cer-
tainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct 
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group, and community harm caused by identity-based bullying and 
cyberbullying most definitely impairs the educational rights and op-
portunities of victims191 and the school.192  Second, because anti-gay 
bullying and cyberbullying amount to egregious harassment in school, 
I argue that just like the First Amendment does not stand in the way 
of harassment and stalking statutes, free speech rights should not 
stand in the way of a school’s disciplinary authority over its students 
who commit the same actions.193
A.  Cyberattacking and Tinker 
  
We have already discussed that a cyberaggressor’s free speech de-
fense deserves a different analysis than a cyberbully’s defense due to 
the differing nature and frequency of the conduct.  I argue that the 
Court’s effects test underlying all its student speech cases is the best 
way to determine if the First Amendment blocks a school’s authority 
to discipline a cyberaggressor.  
1.  Clarifying the Standard 
By now, it should be clear that the off-campus origin of such ag-
gression is irrelevant.194  It should also be clear that the speech/action 
distinction common in First Amendment discourse has no place in 
this analysis.195  Beyond that, clear instruction is hard to come by. 
Tinker’s “material and substantial” disruption standard is highly fact-
specific, a feature of the law that likely explains why neither the Su-
preme Court nor the various circuit courts have stated what kind of 
disruption is sufficient and when such a disruption is reasonably fore-
seeable.  Pennsylvania’s state supreme court has said the disruption 
must be more than “some mild distraction” but need not be “com-
plete chaos,”196
 
would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discip-
line in the operation of the school,’ the prohibition cannot be sustained.”) (quoting Burn-
side v. Byars 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966))). 
 but many incidents on any given school day could fall 
somewhere between those extremes.  Nevertheless, while no fact-
intensive inquiry lends itself to bright line rules and lower courts have 
 191. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 192. Waldman, And All Those Like You, supra note 189. 
 193. See infra Part IV.B. 
 194. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 179–185. 
 196. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (Pa. 2002). 
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come to many divergent conclusions,197 the case law is not without in-
struction.198  But instruction as to what?  To the extent that a given 
event causes a substantial disruption, Tinker’s standard was developed 
to balance students’ political speech rights and the negative effects of 
“disorder” in school caused by a mass student protest.199
Face-to-face aggression and cyberaggression are targeted attacks 
that affect the victim’s physical and mental health, his ability to func-
tion as a competent member of society, and his access to education.
  Cyberaggres-
sion neither involves political speech nor student protests, so that 
standard must be clarified.  To do that, we need look no further than 
the Court’s other student speech cases. 
200  
This kind of aggression, if left untouched by a school’s disciplinary 
authority, also creates an atmosphere of intimidation throughout the 
entire school, making it impossible for students to feel safe and, 
therefore, impossible for them to learn.  Anti-gay bullying is a special 
breed of harassment; it attacks a victim because of his identity.  This 
not only affects the victim qua individual, but it is an affront to those 
who share his identity and, for that matter, all minorities.201
 
 197. Compare e.g., Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating a 
school policy “condition[ing] distribution of all written materials on school premises upon 
prior school review for censorship purposes”), with, e.g., Wiemerslage v. Me. Township 
High Sch. Dist. 207, 29 F.3d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding a school loitering rule 
on the grounds that the school’s concerns over safety and property damages outweighed 
the incidental effect on student speech and assembly), and Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 
763 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding the ability of a school to exclude a student from a student 
council race because he made a rude comment about the assistant principal). 
  To per-
mit the kind of attack on gay identity bound up with the statement 
“All faggots must die” scrawled on a person’s Facebook profile picture 
is to conceive of the individual target of that speech—the person 
 198. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 199. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 & n.3 (1969) 
(stating that a prohibition on expression must be motivated by more than a “mere desire 
to avoid” the discomfort, disorder, and disruption associated with the expression at issue). 
 200. See King, supra note 15, at 851–52 (noting that cyberbulling can cause psychologi-
cal harm and stress that “negatively impacts other areas of [adolescents’] psychological 
and cognitive development” and “can spill over into victims’ social, academic, and family 
lives”); see also Arne Duncan, U.S. Secretary of Education, The Fight to Stop Bullying, Re-
marks to the Anti-Defamation League National Leadership Conference (Apr. 6, 2011), 
http://www.adl.org/education/Letter-adl-bullying-remarks.asp (“Our second principle is 
that no school can be a great school until it is a safe school.  My wife and I have two young 
children.  We want them to learn every day in school, but to do that, they must feel safe 
first.  You cannot do your best or concentrate academically if you are scared.”). 
 201. I expand upon this point, arguing that identity-based peer-to-peer aggression is a 
special category of student speech that merits school discipline under any metric.  See 
Waldman, And All Those Like You, supra note 189; Citron, supra note 15, at 89  (“Such at-
tacks also harm the community that shares the victim's race, gender, religion, or ethnici-
ty—community members experience attacks as if the attacks happened to them.”). 
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whose picture was defaced—as separate and apart from his communi-
ty.  His injury is not simply personal, but communal, an attack on his 
very identity that says all gay people are unworthy of life.202
A narrow reading of Tinker’s substantial disruption standard 
would exclude almost all targeted aggression because, by definition, 
the effects could not cause school-wide disorder or unrest like a pro-
test.
 
203  While we can certainly imagine a particularly egregious case of 
cyberaggression that bleeds into a face-to-face attack, which in turn 
erupts into a massive fight, such incidents are rare and fail to account 
for all the devastation to the student and the school beneath that high 
threshold.  But only a myopic interpretation of Tinker and its progeny 
would restrict a school’s authority to discipline cyberaggressors to the 
stereotypical “disorder” caused by a massive protest.  First, the stan-
dard in Tinker may have been applied to protest,204 but the Court was 
concerned with any interference with “appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school” or the “work of the school.”205  The school’s 
disciplinary authority begins where any “conduct by the student . . . 
materially disrupts classwork or involves . . . invasion of the rights of 
others.”206  A protest is only one way to do that. Peer-to-peer aggres-
sion “collid[es] with the rights of others”207
 
 202. Citron, supra note 
 and can impair a daily les-
son plan when one student fears being near the other or fears raising 
15, at 89 (describing the harmful effects of anti-gay bullying).  
Catharine MacKinnon pioneered a similar view in the 1970s, arguing that sexual harass-
ment of women in the workplace damages all women and that traditional tort remedies 
are, therefore, inadequate.  See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 174–92 (1979); see also Kathryn Abrams, 
The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1220 (1998) 
(“[S]exual harassment as a practice rooted in a struggle between men and women in the 
workplace that perpetuates both male control and the primacy of conventionally mascu-
line norms, that genders both men and women through a variety of dynamics commensu-
rate with their individual and subgroup based variations, and that interferes with the ca-
pacity both to define oneself as a subject and to seek less stereotypic or confining roles.”); 
Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 693 
(1997) (“Sexual harassment is a technology of sexism. It is a disciplinary practice that in-
scribes, enforces, and polices the identities of both harasser and victim according to a sys-
tem of gender norms . . . .”); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1683, 1797 (1998) (explaining that sexual harassment jurisprudence “has failed large 
numbers of people who are not subjected to sexual abuse, but whose competence as work-
ers is constantly thrust into conflict with their identities as women or gender-
nonconforming men”). 
 203. See supra Part II.A. 
 204. A tiny one, at that.  See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (noting that “[o]nly a few of the 
18,000 students in the school” participated, only five of whom were suspended). 
 205. Id. at 509. 
 206. Id. at 513. 
 207. Id. 
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his hand in class for fear of being attacked in the hall or online.  That 
is what the Fourth Circuit recently found in Kowalski v. Berkeley County 
Schools.208  And when a culture of fear pervades a school that sits idly 
by when attacks go on in person or online, no one can teach anyone 
anything, and the school turns into a prison.  Second, Tinker applies 
to all “personal intercommunication among . . . students,” not only 
their politically-related ones.209  At a minimum, then, Tinker accepts 
that impingements on other students’ rights and impairments to dis-
cipline and education can occur when students interact with one 
another beyond the political arena.  Third, one of the values underly-
ing the Court’s respect for the armband walkout was a school’s educa-
tional mission: to “discover[] truth” and to train the nation’s future 
leaders.210  No student can engage in the kind of free exchange of 
ideas that Justice Brennan had in mind in Keyishian v. Board of Regents 
as necessary for civic education when he fears what will happen to 
him afterward.211
These same effects on the school also animated the Court’s deci-
sions in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse.  If the purpose of American pub-
lic education is to “prepare pupils for citizenship” or teach the “habits 
and manners of civility,”
 
212 permitting a student to deliver a graphical-
ly lewd speech winking toward a male student’s sexual prowess was in-
consistent with that mission for a number of reasons: vulgar language 
has no place in civilized debate, the school would become a model for 
inappropriate behavior,213 and the speech itself would damage other 
young students whom the school must teach and protect.214
In holding that schools can determine that vulgar and lewd 
speech would undermine the schools’ basic educational mission, Fras-
er not only tells us that the Court is concerned with effects on the 
school when balancing the unique school environment with free 
speech principles but also broadens the types of effects that merit re-
  It was the 
effects of the speech, and their inconsistency with a school’s basic 
educational mission, that brought Chief Justice Burger to this deci-
sion. 
 
 208. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).  Specifically, the court stated that, “[g]iven the tar-
geted, defamatory nature of Kowalski’s speech, aimed at a fellow classmate, it created ‘ac-
tual or nascent’ substantial disorder and disruption in the school.”  Id. at 574.  
 209. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512. 
 210. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 211. 385 U.S. at 603 (noting that the “marketplace of ideas” of the classroom is most 
effective in the absence of “authoritative selection”). 
 212. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. 
 213. Id. at 683. 
 214. Id. at 683–84. 
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striction.  Tinker addressed protests, and the attendant disruption 
possible from students getting up in the middle of class, agitating the 
school population, and inciting a riot.215  Fraser saw more subtle, but 
no less damaging effects on a school that is put in the position of ta-
citly approving inappropriate language by allowing Fraser to go on 
without punishment.  That is, the reason the First Amendment allows 
a student to “wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket”216
Kuhlmeier reaffirmed the Court’s focus on student speech that 
handicaps a school’s ability to teach.  There, the Court concluded 
that schools cannot be forced into a position of countenancing inap-
propriate speech that bears the imprimatur of the school, whether in-
appropriate via bad grammar or vulgarity, or inappropriate for stu-
dent readers.
 is the 
effect Cohen’s jacket would have on the school.  Teaching respectful 
debate and civic engagement that does not interfere with the school’s 
work has a positive effect on the school, its ability to teach, and its 
reputation: it becomes a place of active learning, civility, and debate.  
But allowing students to use vulgar and lewd language at a school-
sponsored event would make it impossible to teach the impropriety of 
curse words and sexist language in civil society.  
217  Otherwise, schools “would be unduly constrained 
from fulfilling their role” of teaching cultural values, preparing stu-
dents for professional training, and helping children adapt to the civi-
lized world.218
The same analysis held sway in Morse.
  To the Court, this kind of student speech could have 
just as much effect on the school’s ability to teach as disciplinary 
breakdowns associated with group protests and lewd and vulgar 
speeches at school assemblies.  All three forms of speech distract the 
classroom from the curriculum, with all the attendant effects on the 
school’s reputation, its practical and moral authority, and student 
academic success. 
219  The admittedly “silly” 
banner could be interpreted to encourage illegal drug use, which is 
anathematic to school and public policy, in general.220
 
 215. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504–08. 
  The Court 
went to great lengths to remind us of the devastating effects of drug 
use on young children; on the growing drug problem among Ameri-
can youth; and the time, money, and energy Congress, the states, and 
local schools boards have spent on drug-prevention programs, not on-
 216. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Central Sch., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 217. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271. 
 218. Id. at 272. 
 219. Morse, 551 U.S. at 403. 
 220. Id. at 407. 
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ly to establish the evils of drugs but also to highlight the incongruity 
between drug-related speech and a school.221  After all, students who 
“celebrat[e] illegal drug use at a school event, in the presence of 
school administrators and teachers, … pose[] a particular challenge 
for school officials working to protect those entrusted to their care”222
Therefore, moving beyond the obscure confines of the “substan-
tial disruption” standard to the consistent rationale underlying all of 
the Court’s student speech cases to include serious infringements on 
victims’ access to education, to a school’s culture of learning, and to 
the victims’ community at large would retain fidelity to the language 
and spirit of Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse.  It would also reflect a 
modern understanding of how we learn and the psychology of the 
student, data that was not available in 1968.
 
because, like the school in Fraser, any overt or tacit approval of the 
speech would put the school in the position of teaching lessons con-
trary to the curriculum, thus handicapping the school’s ability to 
teach.  Taken together, these conclusions paint a more accurate pic-
ture of what concerned the Court when it rejected student discipline 
in Tinker, but blessed it in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse—the effects on 
the school’s ability to teach its students.  
223  Today, we know that 
intimidation and fear prevent a victim from participating in the learn-
ing process, which includes anything from raising a hand in class to 
answering a question to actually going to school in the first place.224  
When students feel unsafe or ridiculed, they will not learn, infringing 
on their equal right to access an education at a public school.225  We 
also know that harassment not only affects the individual victim in this 
way, but attacks his community.226
 
 221. Id. at 407–08. 
  To suggest that a school does not 
have an interest in avoiding the disruption caused by group harm and 
 222. Id. at 408. 
 223. The breadth of literature in this area is too vast to cite in total.  See generally MATT 
JARVIS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EFFECTIVE LEARNING AND TEACHING (2005) (discussing mod-
ern educational psychology and how it can be used to increase teaching effectiveness); 
Andrew Pollard, Towards a Sociology of Learning in Primary Schools, 11 BRIT. J. SOC. IN EDUC. 
241 (1990) (discussing sociological issues regarding learning processes for primary educa-
tion students); see also, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 70-24-100.3 (West 2005) (“The Legislature 
finds that bullying has a negative effect on the social environment of schools, creates a 
climate of fear among students, inhibits their ability to learn, and leads to other antisocial 
behavior.”). 
 224. WILLARD, supra note 37, at 27–56. 
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 200–201. 
 226. See supra text accompanying notes 201–202. 
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attendant minority unrest227
2.  How to Apply this Standard to Cyberattacking 
 is to ignore common sense and the basic 
realities of the school environment. 
A comprehensive review of the case law reveals several governing 
principles relevant for courts faced with cyberattackers who invoke a 
First Amendment defense.  When the cyberattack takes on a decidedly 
dark and targeted purpose of singling out a victim because of his 
identity, the Court’s effects test should justify disciplining the aggres-
sor. 
First, there is no prerequisite that a specific number of people be 
affected by the speech.  Schools have lawfully punished students for 
speech targeting one member of the school community228
Second, that students simply react to and discuss the speech at is-
sue does not create a sufficient effect on a school’s ability to teach.  
This principle has been clear since Tinker, where there was no sub-
stantial disruption because the armband protest merely caused stu-
dents to poke fun at the protestors, make comments among them-
selves, and caused one student to feel self-conscious.
 and none 
of the litany of student speech cases has ever implied a number re-
quirement to justify discipline.  If we understood a homophobic cybe-
rattack as more than simply a slight poke to the victim’s self-esteem, 
but rather as an attack on the victim’s broader identity and his entire 
community, then degrading the victim can be just as threatening as a 
more overtly graphic attack.  
229
 
 227. See Citron, supra note 
  Nor did 
student discussion and comments about a fake MySpace profile that a 
student created to make fun of her principal create a sufficient effect 
15, at 89 (noting that the marginalization of individuals in 
traditionally “subordinated groups” causes “deep psychological harm” that deprives indi-
viduals of their right to participate in society, provokes retaliation, and promotes commu-
nity unrest); see also Frederick M. Lawrence, The Evolving Federal Role in Bias Crime Law En-
forcement and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 251, 258 & n.20 
(2008) (describing how the “mere perception of a bias crime” incited the Crown Heights 
riots in Brooklyn). 
 228. See, e.g., O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-5671, 2008 
WL 4396895, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (noting that an administrative review panel 
upheld disciplinary action against a student who created a threatening video targeting her 
English teacher); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 34–37 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding 
the suspension of a student for threatening a teacher via an instant messaging system). 
 229. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517–18 (1969) (Black, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the armbands provoked student comments and diverted atten-
tion from regular lessons).  There was also evidence that a math class had been “wrecked” 
by disputes between protesting students and nonprotesting students.  Id. at 517. 
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in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District.230  Here, the court was talking 
about idle chatter, the banal “did you hear what happened” of the 
schoolyard.231
Third, violent or directly threatening speech significantly impairs 
the school’s ability to teach.  In O.Z., for example, a district court 
upheld a school’s removal and transfer of a student who created a 
graphic dramatization of a murder and posted it online.
  This case, then, does not speak to the very real reaction 
that the community of gay students, their friends, and other minori-
ties may have to a homophobic cyberattack in their community.  Idle 
chatter is one thing, but when a group of students are impaled on 
their very identity by a racist or homophobic attack, the disruption to 
the school is more pronounced. 
232  A teacher 
found the video and informed the principal, but there was no evi-
dence that the video had made its way to campus or that it affected 
the teacher’s ability to work.233  The court denied a preliminary in-
junction to stop the transfer because “the violent language and un-
usual photos depicted” in the video made it “reasonable” for school 
officials to expect a serious disruption to school activities.234  The 
teacher could have been attacked or she could have been the subject 
of ridicule from other students; either way, the court found, school 
activities would be substantially affected.235  And, in Wisniewski, where 
a student created a chat icon depicting a teacher shot in the head, the 
icon’s graphic nature was enough to show that “once made known to 
the teacher and other school officials, [it] would foreseeably create a 
risk of substantial disruption.”236  These cases suggest that the mere 
fact that a given incident of cyberattacking is particularly violent may 
be enough under the Court’s effects test.237
 
 230. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931–32 (3d Cir. 2011).  
   
 231. See id. at 922–23 (describing the minor school disruptions caused by students dis-
cussing the profile). 
 232. See O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-5671, 2008 WL 
4396895, at *1, *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (denying student’s request for a court order 
mandating the school district to re-enroll the student). 
 233. See id. at *1 (describing the video at issue and the means by which it was discov-
ered). 
 234. Id. at *3. 
 235. Id. at *4. 
 236. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 237. In LaVine, for example, the Ninth Circuit found that a school could suspend a stu-
dent in an emergency because officials could reasonably expect a serious disruption to 
stem from the student’s poem in which he graphically described his own suicide after 
shooting his classmates.  LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989–90 (9th Cir. 2001).  
Furthermore, in J.S. v. Bethlehem, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found a substantial dis-
ruption under Tinker where a student’s website depicted a beheaded and blood-soaked 
teacher with the caption, “Why Should She Die?”  J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 
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A fourth factor judges consider when determining if cyberattack-
ing has caused a sufficient effect on the school is the extent to which 
school officials must spend time, energy, and effort responding to the 
incident and controlling any damage it caused.  In Doninger, the 
Second Circuit found a substantial disruption was caused by a stu-
dent’s email and blog post criticizing school officials for supposedly 
canceling an event and exhorting her readers to call and complain 
because administrators had to deal with “a deluge of calls and 
emails.”238  They responded to angry emails from parents who were 
misled by the student’s misinformed email and some even came late 
to work because of it.239 Officials also had to take certain students out 
of class because they were “all riled up” and had to address a threat-
ened sit-in.240  Likewise, in Boucher, where a student was expelled for 
distributing a pamphlet with instructions on how to hack into the 
school’s computers,241 the Seventh Circuit found that the time and 
money dedicated to fixing the problems caused by the pamphlet sug-
gested that the school would likely prevail on any First Amendment 
challenge.242  The court noted that the school brought in computer 
experts to assess the security of the system and changed all passwords 
and access codes, suggesting a significant departure from normal day-
to-day activities to respond to the student’s conduct.243
 
A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. 2002).  When she heard of this website, the teacher was frightened and 
could not teach for the rest of the year.  Id. at 852.  While LaVine and J.S. involved factors 
over and beyond violent speech alone, the weight of the case law from other jurisdictions 
suggests that, in most cases, additional inculpatory evidence is not necessary.  See, e.g., Wis-
niewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36 (concluding that the substantial disruption standard had been 
met after a student created and shared a violent image, suggesting that his teacher should 
be killed, despite findings that the student posed no true threat and had created the image 
as a joke).  But see Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782, 784–85 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(finding no substantial disruption where a student’s website asked readers to kill a person 
of their choosing in a particularly graphic fashion). 
  In both these 
cases, the students’ conduct forced school officials to set aside their 
normal responsibilities and devote a significant amount of time to fix-
ing any problems caused by the student.  At a minimum, this consti-
tutes disruption to administrators and teachers, which may be enough 
for a “material and substantial” disruption finding under Tinker.  This 
is another fact-specific inquiry, but it suggests that the incident of cy-
berattacking would have to be sufficiently serious to occupy an 
 238. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 239. Id. at 45–46. 
 240. Id. at 51. 
 241. Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 242. See id. at 827 (finding that the school suffered “tangible harm” and concluding 
that, “more likely than not,” the school would prevail on the merits). 
 243. Id. at 827. 
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amount of time similar to the hours wasted in Doninger and Boucher.  A 
racist or homophobic cyberattack can have real effects on not only 
the victim, but on all minority students, suggesting that this kind of 
hate and aggression may cause teachers and administrators to devote 
significant time to address the community’s fears. 
Fifth, there is some indication that an aggressor’s disciplinary 
past can inform a school’s disciplinary decision and legitimize a 
school’s fear of effects on the school due to that student’s conduct.  
In LaVine, a student wrote a violent poem that described the shooting 
of his classmates.244  Upholding the school’s decision to immediately 
expel the student, the Ninth Circuit singled out the student’s discipli-
nary past, his suicidal behavior, and his record of stalking his former 
girlfriend as sufficient evidence that the school was reasonable to ex-
pect possible violence.245
And, sixth, the effects on the target of the aggression are relevant 
for proving the sufficiency of any effects.  Many student aggression 
cases take into account the effect on the target or victim.  In Kowalski, 
the Fourth Circuit noted that the cyberattacks were “targeted, defa-
matory” and “forced [the victim] to miss school in order to avoid fur-
ther abuse.”
  The poem in LaVine was particularly violent, 
and, as we have seen, the more gruesome the speech, the more likely 
school discipline will be appropriate.  However, this factor could 
make disciplining cyberattackers more likely because it would situate 
a single incident in a pattern of conduct even when those previous in-
cidents of misbehavior are not at issue. 
246  The court was persuaded that the potential for con-
tinued abuse “was real” and that, if the conduct had gone 
unpunished, it would have a “snowballing effect, in some cases result-
ing in ‘copycat’ efforts by other students or in retaliation for the ini-
tial” attack.247  Discipline was warranted and not barred by the First 
Amendment in that case,248 but in J.C., for example, a court denied a 
school disciplinary authority over a student whose video had a fleeting 
and minimal impact on its target.249
Any determination of effects is highly fact-specific, so this factor 
might support discipline in some cases but counsel against it in oth-
   
 
 244. Id. at 983–84. 
 245. Id. at 989–90. 
 246. Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011).  
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 576–77. 
 249. See J.C. v. Beverly Hills Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“[The victim] felt embarrassed, her feelings were hurt, and she temporarily did not want 
to go to class.  These concerns cannot, without more, warrant school discipline.”). 
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ers.  Weighing the effect on the victim has merit as a way of distin-
guishing between examples of the common gave-and-take among ado-
lescents, on the one hand, and more harmful conduct, on the other.  
And while this factor may make lawful discipline hinge on the dumb 
luck of an aggressor who chooses a weak victim, that might be a good 
thing.  By making discipline less likely when an aggressor targets a 
particularly strong victim whose high self-esteem would make him 
able to withstand ridicule, this factor recognizes that cyberattacking, 
like cyberbullying, requires an imbalance of power between the ag-
gressor and the victim.  But, this limited reach of the effects test 
should be expanded to account for not only individual harm, but 
group harm based on a cyberattack on a victim’s identity.250  The 
harm caused by “All Faggots Must Die,” for example, is not limited to 
one gay teenager, but reaches to every gay member of his school and 
every minority who could be the target of the next hateful attack.251
B.  Cyberbullying and Harassment 
 
First Amendment freedoms are no less important for cyberbul-
lies.  Indeed, we are often reminded that free speech rights extend to 
the worst among us.252  Yet, no one enjoys an absolute right to free 
speech; the right is balanced against competing interests in any given 
circumstance.253  A school’s authority to discipline single-incident cy-
berattackers only wilts in front of the First Amendment when the cy-
berattacking is indistinguishable from immature give-and-take among 
adolescents.254  A rule that allows punishment for the more than 70 
percent of students who have engaged in a single incident of aggres-
sive behavior255 is simply overbroad,256 wildly impractical, or both.257
 
 250. See supra text accompanying notes 
  
201–202. 
 251. See Waldman, supra note 201. 
 252. See, e.g., Vill. of Skokie, v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. 1978) 
(“[T]he unpopularity of views, their shocking quality, their obnoxiousness, and even their 
alarming impact is not enough.  Otherwise, the preacher of any strange doctrine could be 
stopped; the anti-racist himself could be suppressed, if he undertakes to speak in ‘re-
stricted’ areas; and one who asks that public schools be open indiscriminately to all ethnic 
groups could be lawfully suppressed, if only he choose to speak where persuasion is 
needed most.” (quoting Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961))). 
 253. E.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465–66 (1995) 
(noting that in evaluating a restraint on speech, a court must balance the interest of the 
state in maintaining order and efficiency against that of the citizen “in commenting upon 
matters of public concern” (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968))). 
 254. See supra Part II. 
 255. Given that the definition of single-incident aggression is broad—sweeping in al-
most anything that can be cruel or harmful to others—and the likely under-reporting 
among students who are willing to admit to bad behavior, most social scientists think this 
 750 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:705 
But an analysis that gives a school a fighting chance to discipline its 
worst offenders recognizes the gravity of bullying and cyberbullying, 
the state’s and school’s compelling interest in preventing such beha-
vior, and the relative infrequency of real cyberbullying cases.  I pro-
pose that given the similarities between the conduct, effects, and hos-
tile environments caused by identity-based bullying and cyberbullying 
in schools, on the one hand, and by standard harassing behavior, on 
the other, we should determine the merit of a cyberbully’s First 
Amendment defense to a school’s disciplinary authority like we would 
analyze a harasser’s First Amendment defense to the liability imposed 
by harassment statutes.258  And while the Supreme Court has never 
explicitly ruled on the constitutionality of harassment or stalking sta-
tutes, all evidence suggests that harassers enjoy little, if any, First 
Amendment protection.259
My proposal ostensibly raises two doctrinal questions that must 
be addressed at the outset.  First, I argued above that the Supreme 
Court’s student speech cases never entertained a bright line on-
campus/off-campus distinction for a school’s disciplinary authority 
because any suggestion of a campus presence requirement was merely 
a proxy for the broader rule that schools maintain authority over their 
students when they act qua students.
  The same should be the case for Zachary, 
our cyberbully.  
260
 
number is closer to 90 to 99 percent.  See GLSEN Survey, supra note 
  That principle, which sub-
51, at xvi (noting that 
62.4 percent of students who were harassed or assaulted failed to report it to school ad-
ministration; and about 90 percent of students participated in or heard derogatory and 
harassing remarks about LGBT students). 
 256. A statute is overbroad if, in banning unprotected speech, it sweeps in protected 
speech.  See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–19 (2003) (“The First Amendment doc-
trine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule regarding the standards for facial 
challenges.  The showing that a law punishes a ‘substantial’ amount of protected free 
speech, ‘judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep,’ suffices to invalidate 
all enforcement of that law, ‘until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation 
so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected 
expression.’” (internal citations omitted)); see also Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 508 (1982) (White, J., concurring) (citations omit-
ted). 
 257. See Susan W. Brenner & Megan Rehberg, “Kiddie Crime”? The Utility of Criminal Law 
in Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2009) (suggesting that an ex-
pansive regime of criminal liability for cyberbullying would be unworkable and have little 
impact in discouraging cyberbullies).   
 258. For a description of state harassment and stalking statutes and their application to 
cyberbullying, see id. at 15–38.  
 259. For a discussion of the application of First Amendment principles to harassment, 
see Kenneth L. Marcus, Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism, 16 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1028 (2008). 
 260. See supra Part III.A. 
 2012] HOSTILE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 751 
jected cyberattackers to school punishment, applies equally to cyber-
bullies.  Therefore, the argument goes, treating cyberbullies, who act 
qua students just as much as cyberattackers, outside Tinker and its 
progeny disproves my student qua student theory.  I disagree.  Single-
incident cyberattackers are still acting qua students by directing their 
aggression against members of the school community they only know 
because they are students.  Undoubtedly, cyberbullies do the same.  
But, unlike cyberattackers, cyberbullies are not just students; they are 
harassers.  A cyberattacker acts qua student because he acts against 
someone he knows from school; his behavior is sometimes characte-
rized by the common give-and-take among immature and sometimes 
mean adolescents.  The average cyberbully takes his conduct to 
another level, whereby his repeated behavior affects his victim in pro-
foundly more serious ways and, as a result, the cyberbully develops a 
dual persona.  The cyberbully is indeed a student, but the character 
and egregiousness of his conduct make him primarily a harasser.261
Second, one could argue that if cyberbullies have free speech 
rights at all, the contours of those rights should be determined 
through the Supreme Court’s student speech cases regardless of the 
nature of the students’ conduct.  This argument posits that, at bot-
tom, Tinker and its progeny govern all student speech regardless of its 
nature, gravity, and effects.  I have already addressed this concern.  
Tinker is powerful precedent and may merit rejuvenation as the pro-
tector of student speech rights, but neither Tinker nor any student 
speech case decided through its lens was based on repeated, targeted 
student speech.  The precedent is, therefore, ill-equipped to address 
the kind of constant barrage of harassing behavior that characterizes 
the conduct of bullies and cyberbullies.  
  
He is no longer solely acting qua student. 
These objections aside, I argue that anti-gay bullying and cyber-
bullying in schools create a hostile educational environment through 
harassment based on sex or sexual nonconformity.  That puts bullies’ 
and cyberbullies’ behavior more in line with standard harassers or 
stalkers, rather than student speakers.  The striking similarity between 
harassment and bullying, together with the similarly situated victims 
and the obvious dissimilarity between single-incident attacking and 
repeated bullying, suggests that identity-based cyberbullying and ha-
rassment merit similar treatment. Other scholars have discussed how 
 
 261. See Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 257, at 2–3.  For a learned discussion of the ar-
gument that updated harassment and stalking laws should not be applied to cyberbullies, 
see id. at 15–45. 
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and to whom to attach liability for bullying and cyberbullying.262
1.  Harassment Statutes 
  With 
respect to potential free speech defenses to that liability, courts 
should remember that harassers, who engage in nearly identical con-
duct as bullies, enjoy little, if any, First Amendment protections.  And 
while there is little case law available to define that boundary clearly, I 
argue that any speech restrictions imposed by harassment statutes are 
permissible as a reasonable balance between legitimate speech inter-
ests and the state’s compelling interest in eradicating the harmful ef-
fects of harassment.  The identity of those interests in the public 
school context suggests that a similar balance is appropriate for cy-
berbullying.  Therefore, just as free speech defenses to harassment 
and stalking liability should fail, so too should the parallel defenses to 
school discipline for cyberbullying. 
As Professor Susan Brenner has noted, harassment statutes are 
among the few criminal statutes that target speech because of the ef-
fect it has on its target.263  For example, some states criminalize send-
ing a letter that conveys a threat,264 and many states criminalize mak-
ing obscene telephone calls;265 but in all cases, a communication is 
criminalized because of its harmful content.  Under the Model Penal 
Code, harassment occurs when, with the intent to harass another, one 
(a) “makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate communi-
cation;” (b) “insults . . . or challenges another in a manner likely to 
provoke violent or disorderly response;” or (c) “makes repeated 
communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours.”266
 
 262. See, e.g., King, supra note 
  
Since the underlying event in any harassment case is a series of com-
munications, we may wonder whether antiharassment laws violate the 
First Amendment. The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that a 
free speech challenge to a harassment statute would fail, but the 
15, at 875 (noting that if schools do not take steps to ad-
dress cyberbullying, they may face liability); see also Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 257, at 
53 (noting that criminal liability may be imposed against a cyberbully convicted of defam-
ing another individual). 
 263. Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and 
Data be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 328 (2003). 
 264. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3004 (West 2010) (criminalizing the sending of 
a threatening letter); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
(criminalizing a threat to terrorize others through violence); see also id. § 250.4(3) (crimi-
nalizing the harassment of others through crude language). 
 265. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.3 (LexisNexis 2011) (criminalizing obscene 
telephone calls with minors). 
 266. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4(1)–(3) (1985). 
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Court has arguably implied it.267  After all, anti-harassment statutes 
criminalize the communication of low value speech if it “strays . . . 
from the values of persuasion, dialogue and free exchange of ideas, 
and moves toward willful threats to perform illegal acts, [where] the 
state has greater latitude to regulate expression,”268
 
 267. The same is true for a free speech challenge to Title VII, the most well known sub-
set of harassment statutes that bans sexual harassment in the workplace.  A number of 
scholars have already concluded as much in the Title VII subcontext, pointing to the 
Court’s silence on a possible First Amendment-Title VII conflict as evidence. Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content-Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bite, 
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9–12 (arguing, in part, that the Court had the opportunity to address 
the argument, fully briefed by the parties, that Title VII imposed an impermissible con-
tent-based restriction on free speech, but declined to do so).  Professor Fallon and others 
have argued that the Supreme Court has “strongly suggested” that a First Amendment 
challenge to Title VII would fail.  See id. (arguing that “it is highly unlikely that workplace 
expressions of gender-based hostility and communications of explicitly sexual messages 
will receive categorical [First Amendment] protection”); see also, e.g., Baty v. Willamette 
Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We note that the Supreme Court has 
strongly suggested that Title VII, in general, does not contravene the First Amendment.”).  
First, the Court declined to address the free speech issues raised by a Title VII hostile envi-
ronment claim in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), despite the opportunity to 
do so.  The defendant-employer briefed the First Amendment issues and the plaintiff ans-
wered. See Fallon, supra, at 9.  Various amici also joined in the chorus.  Id. at 9–10.  The 
Court’s silence on this issue, coupled with its duty to adopt a narrowing construction of 
the statute “to avoid constitutional difficulties” if at all possible, suggests that the Justices 
saw no need to narrow Title VII to avoid impingement on free-speech rights.  Id. at 11. 
 and requires that 
those communications be done in a manner likely to provoke a nega-
Second, the Court’s opinion in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1993), implied that a 
hostile-environment claim would survive a free-speech challenge.  See id. at 389 (noting 
that because words can violate laws directed against conduct, such words that are sexually 
derogatory may violate Title VII).  In that case, the Court struck down a municipal hate-
speech ordinance that banned only those “fighting words” that expressed hate on the basis 
of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.  Id. at 381.  The problem was that the law banned 
only one viewpoint: “aspersions upon a person’s mother, for example[,] would seemingly 
be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance 
and equality, but could not be used by those speakers’ opponents.”  Id. at 391.  In other 
words, as a law against intolerant speech, the statute was impermissible viewpoint discrimi-
nation.  Id.  Four Justices attacked this theory from all angles, including the warning that 
“hostile work environment claims based on sexual harassment should fail First Amend-
ment review” based on the majority’s holding. Id. at 409–10 (White, J., concurring).  Jus-
tice Scalia anticipatorily responded that Title VII can withstand scrutiny by noting that 
“words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against 
conduct,” and if “the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive 
content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminato-
ry idea.”  Id. at 389–90 (majority opinion).  As a result, so-called “fighting words” that are 
sexually discriminatory could still produce a hostile workplace environment in violation of 
Title VII.  Lower courts have agreed with this analysis.  See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite 
Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn. 1993) (“Title VII may legitimately proscribe 
conduct, including undirected expressions of gender intolerance, which create an offen-
sive working environment.  That expression is ‘swept up’ in this proscription does not vi-
olate First Amendment principles.”). 
 268. In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Cal. 1995). 
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tive response from the victim.269  Most state harassment and stalking 
statutes agree.  Missouri’s stalking statute, for example, states that an-
yone “who purposely and repeatedly harasses . . . another person 
commits the crime of stalking,” and defines “harasses” as engaging in 
“a course of conduct directed at a specific person that serves no legi-
timate purpose, that would cause a reasonable person to suffer sub-
stantial emotional distress, and that actually causes substantial emo-
tional distress to that person.”270  Delaware’s harassment statute makes 
it a crime to “harass . . . another person” by insulting, taunting, or 
challenging them, or engaging “in any other course of alarming or 
distressing conduct which serves no legitimate purpose and is in a 
manner which the person knows is likely to . . . cause a reasonable 
person to suffer substantial emotional distress.”271  This interplay be-
tween communication of harmful speech and a reasonable produc-
tion of actual harm or fear in the victim is precisely what has upheld 
the constitutionality of other statutes, like anti-intimidation or anti-
stalking rules, from free speech challenges.272
2.  Bullying in Schools and Harassment  
  As their close cousins, 
harassment laws are likely similarly immune from First Amendment 
challenges. 
Harassment, then, differs from its non-actionable cousin of simp-
ly being mean to one another in the same ways that a school rife with 
bullying and cyberbullying differs from one characterized by the 
normal give-and-take of adolescence.  There may be no precise boun-
dary or bright line rule that identifies the hostile environments 
created by harassment, but it is clear that the severe and pervasive ab-
usive conduct that characterizes bullying and cyberbullying shares the 
same five characteristics as behavior that falls under standard harass-
ment statutes.  First, both bullying and harassment require a pattern 
 
 269. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 270. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (West 1999). Michigan’s statute is almost identical. See 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411h(1)(b) (West 2004) (criminalizing stalking). 
 271. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(1) (2007).  Massachusetts’s statute treats ha-
rassment as a separate offense, and makes it a crime to inflict emotional distress upon a 
victim.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 265, § 43A(a) (West 2008). 
 272. See Robert P. Faulkner & Douglas H. Hsiao, And Where You Go I’ll Follow: The Consti-
tutionality of Antistalking Laws and Proposed Model Legislation, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 19 
(1994) (noting that expression of a “violent nature” which perpetuates fear in the victim is 
not speech protected by the First Amendment). 
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of repeated conduct.273  Second, the kind of abusive behavior is simi-
lar.274  Third, the victims of abuse are so-called weaker parties, identi-
fied, in part, by their real or perceived minority status in the school or 
workplace environments.275  Fourth, bullying and harassment have 
the same effects on their victims.276  Fifth, both forms of harassment 
can be executed beyond the four walls of the shared environment.277
a.  Repetition 
  
These striking similarities, coupled with the clear differences between 
this kind of harassing conduct and the behavior at issue in Tinker and 
its progeny, suggest that bullying and cyberbullying in schools should 
be treated more like harassment than student speech. 
Every court to address a criminal harassment claim has stated 
that repetition of the conduct is determinative.278  This makes sense 
given the plain language of most states’ harassment and stalking sta-
tutes.  Notably, this is also the case in the Title VII harassment con-
text.279
 
 273. See Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 
  Similarly, bullying must be repeated.  The repetition of hostile 
257, at 2–3 (describing cyberbulling as a pattern 
of repeated behavior); see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (West 1999) (defining harassment 
as involving a “course of conduct”). 
 274. For a discussion of cyberbullying behavior, see supra Part II.  See also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(1) (2007) (describing harassment as behavior consisting of insults, 
taunts, or challenges made with the intent to “harass, annoy, or alarm another person”). 
 275. See Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 257, at 3–4 (observing that bullying often in-
volves a “power imbalance” whereby the bully has “some advantage” that can harm the vic-
tim); Grace S. Ho, Not Quite Rights: How the Unwelcomeness Element in Sexual Harassment Law 
Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 131, 135–36 (2008) 
(noting that sexual harassment in the workplace arises from the power imbalance between 
males and females). 
 276. For a discussion of some of the impacts of cyberbullying, see supra Part II.  See also 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(1) (2007) (defining harassment as acting in such a 
manner “which the person knows is likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response or 
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress”). 
 277. See infra Part IV.B.2.e; see also Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual 
Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 563 (2001) (noting that a significant amount of 
the workplace harassment claims involve behavior taking place outside of the office). 
 278. See, e.g., Schwefel v. Kramschuster, No. 2010AP2924, 2011 WL 4550217, at ¶24 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2011) (“Harassment, as relevant here, is defined as ‘[e]ngaging in a 
course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts which harass or intimidate another per-
son and which serve no legitimate purpose.’” (quoting WIS. STAT. § 813.125(1)(b))).  
 279. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 648 (2007), 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 
111, 113–15 (2002)) (noting that the nature of hostile environment claims “‘involves re-
peated conduct.  The unlawful employment practice’ in hostile work environment claims, 
‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day.  It occurs over a series of days or perhaps 
years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actiona-
ble on its own.’  The persistence of the discriminatory conduct both indicates that man-
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acts is not only a defining element in the social science literature,280
b.  Conduct 
 
but it distinguishes between the common give-and-take among ado-
lescents and significantly more egregious conduct. Cyberattacking 
does not share this characteristic. 
The kind of abusive behavior that constitutes harassment is also 
similar to bullying behavior in schools.  There may be no clear rule 
that defines which conduct will amount to sufficiently severe harass-
ment in either case, but a random survey of all harassment cases (in-
cluding Title VII) evidences the striking identity of bad conduct.  Us-
ing derogatory and degrading sexual terms to describe the victim,281 
repeatedly communicating in a manner likely to alarm,282 making 
sexually explicit comments283 and overtly sexual gestures,284 spreading 
sexual rumors,285 attempting to physically abuse the victim,286
 
agement should have known of its existence and produces a cognizable harm. . . . [T]he 
very nature of the hostile work environment claim involves repeated conduct . . . .”) (in-
ternal citations omitted)), superseded on other grounds by statute. 
 drawing 
 280. Nansel defines “bullying” as “a specific type of aggression in which (1) the behavior 
is intended to harm or disturb, (2) the behavior occurs repeatedly over time, and (3) there 
is an imbalance of power, with a more powerful person or group attacking a less powerful 
one.”  Nansel, supra note 16, at 2094. 
 281. Compare, e.g., Spencer v. Gen. Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 218–19 (E.D. Va. 1988) 
(discussing “derogatory and degrading comments” about the victim and the female gend-
er), with Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the student 
endured slurs about his sexuality). 
 282. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4) (West 2011) (criminalizing harass-
ment of others). 
 283. Compare, e.g., Grazioli v. Genuine Parts Co., 409 F. Supp. 2d 569, 573 (D.N.J. 2005) 
(noting that on “‘Monday through Friday’ [the harasser] made ‘offensive, sexually related 
comments and hand gestures[,]’ . . . used words such as ‘fuck’ and . . . referenced ‘blow 
jobs’ ‘as part of his general conversation throughout the day’”), with Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 
451 (describing the use of sexually explicit terms and gestures about gay sex to torment 
the victim), and Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 955 
(D. Kan. 2005) (noting that fellow students referred to the plaintiff as a “faggot,” scream-
ing that “Dylan likes to suck cock,” and telling the school that “Dylan masturbates with 
fish”). 
 284. Compare, e.g., Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 61 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (noting that the aggressor “pretended to masturbate and ejaculate at victim be-
hind her back to express his anger with her”), with Theno, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 955 (describ-
ing how students performed mock fellatio as emblematic of the victim’s alleged sexual be-
havior). 
 285. Compare, e.g., Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 1994) (spreading rumors 
that the victim was sexually involved with a superior), and Jew v. Univ. of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 
946, 949 (S.D. Iowa 1990) (noting that a rumor spread about the victim and her colleague 
having a sexual relationship), with Theno, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 956 (describing how students 
started a rumor that the victim was caught masturbating in the school bathroom). 
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vulgar and explicit graffiti,287 grabbing the victim in aggressive and 
explicit ways,288 making negative comments about the victim’s identi-
ty,289 creating a rating system to assess the attractiveness of victims,290
c.  Victims 
 
and a plethora of other behaviors characterize harassing environ-
ments. 
In hostile workplace and educational environments, the victims 
of harassment are the so-called “weaker” party, or perceived as such, 
based on their minority status.  Social scientists require a “power im-
balance” between the aggressor and the victim for conduct to meet 
the definition of bullying,291 but just like women are not the only vic-
tims of harassment, the traditional image of a bully as a popular, 
strong, athletic, and aggressive male who targets a physically weaker 
student fails to capture the broad sweep of a power imbalance.  A vic-
tim’s minority status can also cause a power imbalance; for example, 
ethnicity may function as a status characteristic and can lead to an 
imbalance of power, especially between members of ethnic minorities 
on the one hand and ethnic majority group members on the other.292
 
 286. Compare, e.g., Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 926 (M.D. Ala. 
1992) (describing a shouting match leading to assault), with Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 452 (de-
scribing physical abuse by a student). 
  
Women have long been minorities in the workplace and in some in-
 287. Compare, e.g., Baty v. Willamette Indus., 985 F. Supp. 987, 992 (D. Kan. 1997) (dis-
cussing the existence of graffiti in the men’s bathroom specifically pertaining to the vic-
tim’s sexuality, exploits, and relationships), with Theno, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 955–56 (display-
ing depictions of the plaintiff or of gay sex). 
 288. Compare, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374 (8th Cir. 1996) (al-
leging that “at least twelve different male co-workers bagged [the victim] on some 100 oc-
casions . . . ‘Bagging’ is . . . the intentional grabbing and squeezing of another person’s 
testicles.”), with Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 451 (describing the mock rape of the victim). 
 289. Compare, e.g., Stephenson v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 915 F. Supp. 39, 43–44 (S.D. 
Ind. 1995) (demeaning and derogatory comments about women in the workplace as “sluts 
and whores”), with Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 451–52 (commenting derogatorily about gays). 
 290. Compare, e.g., Wall v. A.T. & T. Tech., Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (M.D.N.C. 
1990) (using a one-to-ten rating system to assess the physical attributes of women), with 
Blumenfeld & Cooper, supra note 18, at 119 (including online polling pages to rate victims 
as “hottest” or “ugliest” as examples of cyberaggressive behavior). 
 291. Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 257, at 4; Ericson, supra note 18.  
 292. Elizabeth G. Cohen et al., Treating Status Problems in the Cooperative Classroom, in 
COOPERATIVE LEARNING: THEORY & RESEARCH 203–05 (Shlomo Sharan ed., 1990) (de-
scribing race and ethnicity as status characteristics that impact the “prestige and power or-
der” of small groups working together). See also Waldman, supra note 201. 
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dustries more than others.293 And, like women—who make up the vast 
majority of targets of sexual abuse in the workplace294—ethnic, racial, 
and sexual identity minorities are often the most severely bullied stu-
dents in school.295
d.  Effects 
  Though these minorities can be victimized by sin-
gle-incident aggression, so too is almost everyone else in school.  Con-
versely, minorities are over-represented among victims of bullying and 
harassment. 
Given the similarities in conduct and types of victims, it should 
come as no surprise that bullying and harassment harm their victims 
in similarly devastating ways.  Harassment and school bullying have 
been found to cause stress, anxiety, mood swings, and depression.  
They create feelings of embarrassment, shame, and low self-esteem.296
 
 293. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1491 (M.D. Fla. 991) 
(noting that the target, Lois Robinson, was a welder, and thus a minority in the welding 
industry). 
    
 294. Women, however, are not the only victims. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76–77 (1998) (noting that Oncale was a male subject to sexual ha-
rassment in the workplace).  For a good summary of some notable male-victim cases and 
their legal strategies, see Stephen J. Nathans, Comment, Twelve Years After Price Waterhouse 
and Still No Success for “Hopkins in Drag”: The Lack of Protection for the Male Victim of Gender 
Stereotyping Under Title VII, 46 VILL. L. REV. 713, 724–39 (2001). 
 295. The GLSEN Survey revealed that 88.9 percent of students heard the word “gay” 
used in a negative way, 72.4 percent heard other homophobic remarks (that is, “dyke” or 
“faggot”) in school and online, and 84.6 percent were verbally harassed (that is, called 
names or threatened with violence) at school because of their sexual orientation.  GLSEN 
Survey, supra note 51, at xvi.  More than 40 percent were physically harassed (that is, 
pushed, shoved, or otherwise physically attacked) at school in the past year because of 
their sexual orientation, and 27.2 percent were harassed based on their gender expression.  
Id.  Nearly 20 percent were physically assaulted (that is punched, kicked, or attacked with a 
weapon), and nearly 53 percent were harassed or threatened via electronic media (that is, 
text messages, emails, instant messages, or postings on Facebook).  Id.  As a result, more 
than 61 percent felt unsafe at school because of their sexual orientation and 39.9 percent 
felt unsafe at school because of how they expressed their gender.  Id.  
 296. Id.  In particular, Professor Harvey Hornstein has showed correlations between “a 
boss’s abusive disrespect” and depression, anxiety, and low self-esteem.  HARVEY A. 
HORNSTEIN, BRUTAL BOSSES AND THEIR PREY 74–75 (1996).  See Jane E. Brody, Researchers 
Unravel the Motives of Stalkers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/ 
08/25/science/researchers-unravel-the-motives-of-stalkers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
(noting that “the repeated harassment commonly results in acute emotional distress and 
can seriously disrupt the way victims live”).  These psychological effects have been linked 
to serious physical effects, like cardiovascular disease and musculoskeletal disorders.  See 
NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, STRESS AT WORK 11 (1999), 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/99-101/pdfs/99-101.pdf (noting that psychologically 
demanding positions can cause cardiovascular and musculoskeletal disorders, among oth-
ers).  See generally Ybarra, supra note 36 (discussing the psychological effects of cyberbully-
ing, including depression); Nishina & Juvonen, supra note 36 (discussing the psychological 
and social effects of harassment on youth); Michele L. Ybarra, Linkages Between Depressive 
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More severe effects can include PTSD,297 and even severe physical ef-
fects like compromised immunity to infection, headaches, spikes in 
blood pressure, and digestive problems related to stress.298  The Su-
preme Court recognized these damaging effects in Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, Inc., noting that a “discriminatorily abusive work environ-
ment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’ psychologi-
cal well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job perfor-
mance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep 
them from advancing in their careers.”299
e.  Location 
  And various courts and 
scholars have chronicled similar effects in bullying victims.  Single-
incident cyberattacking does not share this characteristic. 
Harassment targets its victims anywhere and everywhere.  We 
have already seen how bullies can harass their victims even when not 
on school property300 and how the multi-location reach of state crimi-
nal harassment statutes is clear from their plain language.  Harass-
ment can involve phone calls,301 sexually explicit and lewd emails,302 
looking at pornography online, knowing it will be seen or heard by 
others,303 harassing text messages, and vulgar and sexually explicit Fa-
cebook posts, and “email bombing.”304
 
Symptomatology and Internet Harassment Among Regular Internet Users, 7 CYBERPSCHOLOGY 
BEHAV. 247 (2004) (describing the link between depression and cyberbullying). 
  Just like our modern lives are 
 297. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the vic-
tim was diagnosed with PTSD as a result of the trauma exhibited from bullying). 
 298. David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of ‘Workplace Bullying’ and the Need for Status-Blind 
Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 483 (2000).  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS 21–23 (2001) (describing vic-
tim experiences of stalking); see also WILLARD, supra note 37, at 27–56 (discussing how bul-
lying affects victims in many different ways). 
 299. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
 300. See supra Part II.A. 
 301. See, e.g., Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Inst’l Div., 512 F.3d 157, 164 
(5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that ten to fifteen nightly phone calls for nearly four months 
from the plaintiff's supervisor amounted to pervasive harassment). 
 302. E.g., Lee v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, No. 07-677, 2007 WL 2463404, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 
28, 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss a Title VII gender discrimination claim where sup-
porting allegations in the complaint showed that the plaintiff had received pornographic 
emails). 
 303. E.g., E.E.O.C. v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 171 (4th Cir. 2009) (discuss-
ing an employee who watched pornography at his desk and cursed loudly to retaliate 
against a co-worker, who sat adjacent to his desk). 
 304. Email “bombing” is a form of net abuse where an attacker sends huge volumes of 
email to an address in an attempt to overflow the mailbox or a server host.  This usually 
causes the victim’s service to be shut off.  As Professor Citron has detailed, email “bomb-
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digital,305 the modern school is wired with Internet access and inte-
grates technology into the curriculum.  Many employers allow “tele-
work” or “remote work,” permitting their employees to work from 
home and providing the hardware and software to do it.306  Increa-
singly, we communicate with one another over Skype,307 and partici-
pate in chat rooms. Many of us maintain Facebook or online dating 
profiles.308  According to one recent study, 81 percent of adults age 
thirty to forty-nine and 70 percent of adults age fifty to sixty-four have 
an online presence.309
3.   Implications of Similarities: Cyberbullying and the First 
Amendment 
  This places them squarely in the same virtual 
role occupied by students, making them similarly subject to cyberha-
rassment and cyberaggressive behavior. 
Like Amelia, the cyberaggressor challenging her punishment on 
First Amendment grounds, Zachary the cyberbully is likely to offer the 
same campus presence and pure speech arguments.310
 
ing” is a common tool used by men to silence women’s voices online.  See Citron, supra 
note 
  In the alterna-
tive, he is likely to argue that his conduct could have no effect on the 
school because his behavior was directed at one individual, not the 
school.  These arguments miss the point.  Harassment of one can 
create hostility for all, but even if there was a per se rule that intimida-
tion of one student could never cause a sufficient effect on a school, a 
school’s decision to discipline Zachary should not be judged through 
the student speech context.  Zachary was not simply acting qua stu-
dent when he abused his victims over a period of time; he was acting 
much like a harasser.  His argument that he should not be subject to 
15. 
 305. See Ari Waldman, Aristotle’s Internet: Classical Values in Our Digital Lives (unpublished 
manuscript). 
 306. See OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, STATUS OF TELEWORK IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2011), http://www.telework.gov/Reports 
_and_Studies/Annual_Reports/2010teleworkreport.pdf (describing the increased inci-
dence of teleworking). 
 307. See How to Ace a Job Interview on Skype, TIME, http://www.time.com/ 
time/video/player/0,32068,46937715001_1933401,00.html (illustrating how companies, 
in efforts to save costs, increasingly use Skype or online video chat to conduct interviews). 
 308. Forty-seven percent of online adults maintain a profile on a social networking site.  
While that is significantly lower than teenagers (ages twelve to seventeen) and young 
adults (ages eighteen to twenty-nine), the number has grown exponentially in the last five 
years.  Amanda Lenhart et al., Social Media & Mobile Internet Use Among Teens and Young 
Adults, PEWINTERNET.ORG, at 17 (2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files 
/Reports/2010/PIP_Social_Media_and_Young_Adults_Report_Final_with_toplines.pdf. 
 309. Id. at 5. 
 310. See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text. 
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school discipline for conduct that took place off campus will fail not 
because the Court’s effects test never required a campus presence, 
but because liability under traditional harassment law is not limited to 
face-to-face conduct.  Similarly, Zachary’s potential First Amendment 
defense to discipline should fail not because his conduct affected the 
school, but because, similar to harassment laws, any incidental im-
pingements on free speech are permissible given that students are 
“captive audiences” for the purposes of First Amendment jurispru-
dence and given the state’s compelling interest to prevent harassment 
in schools and ensure educational opportunities for all. 
Context pervades First Amendment jurisprudence; it is essential 
for determining when restrictions on speech are permissible.311  And, 
given the similarities between traditional harassment and bullying in 
schools, free speech defenses to harassment liability and school discip-
linary authority should fail, as a matter of First Amendment doctrine, 
for the same three reasons.  First, the state’s interest in restricting, 
eradicating, and punishing hostile, harassing, or abusive speech may 
clash with fundamental free speech principles, but any such clash, 
even with significant impingements on harasser speech rights, would 
survive strict scrutiny.  To survive strict scrutiny, a restriction on ex-
pression must be supported by a “compelling” government interest, it 
must be necessary to accomplish that interest, and it must be narrowly 
tailored so it exerts the least possible burden on free speech rights.312  
Even laws that are content- or viewpoint-based are permissible if they 
pass strict scrutiny.313
 
 311. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 736, 747–48 (1978) (“Because content of that 
character is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances, we 
must consider its context in order to determine whether the Commission’s action was con-
stitutionally permissible.”). 
  
 312. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(holding that an agreement between a union representative and a school board, giving 
that representative exclusive access to the teachers’ mailboxes and thereby excluding a 
rival union, was unconstitutional because restricting the speech of the rival union was not 
narrowly tailored to a compelling interest of the school board); see also Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535–36 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (ruling that a prohi-
bition on gender discrimination in the workplace constitutes “compelling” state interest 
within the meaning of First Amendment strict scrutiny). 
 313. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (ruling that intentional financial discrimination designed to suppress 
certain ideas is not per se suspect); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 
814 (2000) (noting that where a statute regulates speech based on its content, it is subject 
to strict scrutiny); John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 878 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring 
narrow tailoring aimed at a compelling government interest). 
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The state has a compelling interest in eradicating harassment 
and its resulting discrimination.314  And the specific focus of harass-
ment and stalking statutes—reaching significant harm while leaving 
untouched the kind of ordinary give-and-take among people—means 
that the statutes are both necessary and sufficiently narrowly tailored 
to survive any strict scrutiny analysis on a claim that they violate fun-
damental free speech rights.315
The unique context of the school creates a compelling interest in 
eradicating from our schools the kind of harassment caused by identi-
ty-based bullying and cyberbullying even when it is not based on sex.  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the role of public 
education is to do more than teach reading, writing, and arithmetic.  
It “must prepare pupils for citizenship” and “inculcate the habits and 
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and 
as indispensible to the practice of self-government . . . .”
  The similarities between harassment 
and bullying, together with the salient and unique roles schools play 
in educating the nation’s youth for participation in civil society, sug-
gests that there is a compelling interest in eradicating hostile educa-
tional environments, as well.  Presumably, the school has a mandate 
to teach anti-harassing behavior; after all, a school would not be ade-
quately preparing students for the workforce if it was training 
workplace harassers.  Subjecting bullies and cyberbullies to school 
discipline is also a sufficiently narrowly tailored tactic given the egre-
giousness and rarity of true bullying cases. 
316  Schools 
“inculcat[e] fundamental values”317 not only through books, but by 
example, teaching “lessons of civil, mature conduct” both in and out 
of the classroom.318
 
 314. See, e.g., Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (affirming that the state has a 
“compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens”); Bd. of Dir. 
of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (same).  See also Deborah 
Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the Workplace: Running the Gauntlet of 
Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 436–42 (1996) (providing an in-
depth and comprehensive constitutional and policy argument in favor of the government’s 
compelling interest in eradicating sex discrimination in the workplace). 
  The lesson that we should not harass, abuse, or 
mistreat those who are different, weak, or easy targets is undoubtedly 
part of the “civil, mature conduct” that is both essential to growing up 
and essential to a functioning democracy.  Furthermore, just like the 
Court acknowledged that schools have an “important—indeed, per-
 315. See Epstein, supra note 314, at 442–46 (developing more fully the necessity and nar-
row tailoring arguments).  
 316. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting CHARLES A. 
BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). 
 317. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979). 
 318. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
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haps compelling” interest in deterring illegal behavior, such as drug 
use,319 and buttressed that strong interest with evidence about the ex-
tensive school drug problem, there is ample evidence that growing 
incivility among our youth and adult population is causing personal 
and systemic harm. Identity-based bullying and cyberbullying is get-
ting worse,320 and has contributed to the deaths of no less than ten 
young men and women in the last two years alone.321  It has particu-
larly devastating effects on minority populations and those so-called 
“hidden populations” that are victimized not only by aggressors at 
school, but by a greater community that hates them.322  And outside 
the school context, our public discourse is so deeply infected with in-
civility, ad hominem attacks, and expressions of hate that it took the 
shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords to even get us talking 
about how we treat one another.323
 
 319. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)). 
  Politicians are adults; they can 
 320. A comparison of two Youth Internet Safety Surveys conducted in 2000 and 2006 
suggests that cyberbullying is becoming more common.  In 2006, 9 percent of survey par-
ticipants reported being harassed online with almost 33 percent surveyed admitting to ac-
tivities that fit the cyberbullying definition.  Those numbers are up from 6 percent and 12 
percent, respectively, from the 2000 study.  JANIS WOLAK ET AL., ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF 
YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER 10–11 (2006), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf. 
 321. See, e.g., Meghan Barr, 1 Ohio School, 4 Bullied Teens Dead at Own Hand, MSNBC 
(Oct. 8, 2010, 2:56 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39578548/ns/health-
kids_and_parenting/ (noting three teen suicides and one overdose over the past two years 
as a result of school tormenting); Lisa Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal 
Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010, at A1 (describing the suicide of a male college student 
following his roommate’s online posting of a webcam video); Andrew Knittle, North Grad 
Took Own Life After Week of ‘Toxic’ Comments, NORMAN TRANSCRIPT, Oct. 10, 2010, 
http://normantranscript.com/headlines/x1477594493/-I-m-sure-he-took-it-personally 
(describing a teen suicide following attendance at a series of anti-homosexual town meet-
ings); Kevin Cullen, Standing Up for Phoebe, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2010, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/03/30/standing_up_fo
r_phoebe/ (describing a prosecutor’s decision to press charges against a teen’s tormenters 
following the teen’s suicide). 
 322. See Douglas D. Heckathorn, Respondent-Driven Sampling II: Deriving Valid Population 
Estimates from Chain-Referral Samples of Hidden Populations, 49 SOC. PROBS. 11, 11–13 (2002) 
(discussing methods of sampling hidden populations, including homosexuals).  Gays and 
lesbians are only one type of hidden population.  Another is someone who cannot come 
forward and identify himself for fear of legal reprisal, like an intravenous drug user.  Id. at 
11.  As such, it is difficult for social scientists to reach this population for study.  Id.  Profes-
sor Heckathorn has pioneered the use of online social networks to reach this type of popu-
lation. 
 323. See, e.g., Helene Cooper & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Calls for a New Era of Civility in U.S. 
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, at A1.  Some have argued that increasingly aggressive 
bullies and cyberbullies are taking their cues from an increasingly aggressive political and 
social discourse.  See, e.g., Judith Barr, Bullying in the Policial Arena: What are we Teaching Our 
Children?,  HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
judith-barr/political-bullying_b_982079.html (listing examples of bullying in politics and 
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handle themselves.  Children cannot.  And, if the Court is serious 
about “civil, mature conduct” being essential to both schooling and 
democracy,324
Second, harassing or abusive speech that creates hostile working 
or educational environments falls within the “captive audience” ex-
ception to the First Amendment.  The First Amendment permits re-
strictions on certain kinds of offensive speech when the target of the 
speech has no recourse to avoid it.
 then schools have a mandate to punish behavior that is 
incongruous with those principles. 
325  The exception appears to be 
based on the privacy interests of the listeners, inasmuch as their priva-
cy is being invaded by aggressive, intolerable speech,326 and requires 
that they have no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech.327  
After all, “The right to express ideas does not include the right to im-
pose the communication of those ideas upon an unwilling listen-
er. . . .  Citizens have a right to speak. Citizens also have a right not to 
be forced to listen.”328
The case law involving captive audiences suggests the doctrine is 
a misnomer.  Permissible regulation of speech does not hinge on the 
relative “captivity” of the audience wherever they may be, as the doc-
  Because of the unique characteristics of a 
workplace and a school, workers and students should be considered 
captive audiences. 
 
questioning the impact such examples have on children). And, still, our political discourse 
is uncivil.  After testifying at a House of Representatives committee hearing, Georgetown 
law student Sandra Fluke was called a “slut” and a “prostitute” by conservative talk radio 
host Rush Limbaugh.  These disgusting comments prompted a tepid response from the 
Republican Party’s leading candidate for its presidential nomination, Mitt Romney: “It’s 
not the language I would have used.”  Alex Seitz-Wald, Romney Declines To Criticize Limbaugh 
— Again, THINK PROGRESS, Mar. 7, 2012, at http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2012/ 
03/07/439483/romney-limbaugh-fail/?mobile=nc. 
 324. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (finding that 
schools have an obligation to promote civil and mature conduct). 
 325. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 
541–42 (1980) (the government cannot prohibit “speech as intrusive unless the ‘captive’ 
audience cannot avoid objectionable speech,” and therefore ruling that a utility company 
may include “controversial matters of public policy” within the same envelope as a billing 
statement because a customer can easily “avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities 
by averting their eyes”). 
 326. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ( “[T]the ability of government . . . 
to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a show-
ing that susbstantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable man-
ner.”). 
 327. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21–22).  In 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), Justice Douglas, a usual ally of Justice 
Black’s First Amendment absolutism, stated that there is “no right to force [a] message 
upon [those] incapable of declining to receive it.”  Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 328. Von Lusch v. C & P Tel. Co., 457 F. Supp. 814, 819 (D. Md. 1978) (quoting Von 
Lusch v. State, 39 Md. App. 517, 525, 387 A.2d 306, 310 (1978)). 
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trine’s name might suggest, but on the unique relationship between 
the audience and the place holding that audience “captive.”329  This 
explains why the Court has used the doctrine to uphold restrictions 
on television broadcasts,330 mail,331 and harassing phone calls332 in the 
home, even though it is easy to change the channel, throw out un-
wanted mail, or hang up the telephone, but has declined to extend 
the doctrine to restrictions on offensive speech in places like a school 
board meeting,333 from which it possible to escape, but only if you are 
willing to give up your right to be heard.  Even though residents in 
their home can avoid what they feel is offensive or abusive speech by 
ignoring or discarding it, the fact that the speech invades the home—
where we are lords of our own manors—is paramount.  This near ex-
clusive application of the “captive audience” doctrine to the home has 
moved some scholars, most notably Eugene Volokh,334 to argue that 
this exception does not adequately justify Title VII’s restrictions on co-
worker speech.335
Professor Volokh believes that this precedent means that the 
home may be the only locus of a captive audience,
 
336
 
 329. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 307 (arguing that a municipality cannot post advertise-
ments on the inside of city buses, not because of the posters’ content but because buses 
are a practical necessity for individuals in urban areas and thus they are a “captive au-
dience”). 
 but in so con-
cluding, he misses the Court’s multi-layered reasoning.  What permits 
a captive audience exception in the home is not the home itself, but 
rather our refusal to accept that evidently easy avoidance should be 
necessary in the home.  We are not held “captive” in the home any 
more than we are captive on the street because we can simply turn off 
a television, walk into another room, or step outside.  But because of 
 330. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978). 
 331. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970). 
 332. See, e.g., Gormley v. Dir., Conn. State Dep’t of Prob., 632 F.2d 938, 942 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
 333. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). 
 334. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
1791, 1838–40 (1992) (arguing that the captive audience doctrine should not be extended 
to the workplace). 
 335. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Zero Tolerance for the First Amendment: Title VII’s Regula-
tion of Employee Speech, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 563, 565–67 (2001) (noting that the captive 
audience exception “as currently structured does not fit harassment cases”); Jules B. Ge-
rard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harass-
ment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003, 1031 (1993) (“A workplace is not a home.”). 
 336. See Volokh, supra note 334, at 1834–35 (rationalizing that only the physical boun-
daries of the home could reconcile the Supreme Court’s decision to protect speech in Ro-
wan and Cohen, two cases in which the listeners were arguably more captive than a listener 
in a home who could simply throw a pamphlet in the trash or turn off the radio). 
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the unique role of the home in the privacy rights of the resident, we 
should not have to.  The Court’s precedents limiting the captive au-
dience exception to the home are based on “[t]he ancient concept 
that ‘a man’s home is his castle’ into which ‘not even the king may en-
ter . . . .’”337  It is not the edifice that gives meaning to this well-worn 
saying; it is our expectation of privacy within the home that does.  
This explains why Paul Cohen could wear his “Fuck the Draft” jacket 
in a courthouse despite the argument that he “thrust” his “distasteful 
mode of expression . . . upon unwilling or unsuspecting viewers.”338  
Courthouse visitors have no right to a captive audience exception be-
cause we do not associate important privacy rights with visitors to 
courthouses.339
Granted, while my theory that the captive audience exception is 
applicable to those contexts that implicate important, perhaps fun-
damental, privacy rights takes the exception out of the limited boun-
daries of the home, it does not necessarily extend it to the workplace 
or the school, for example.  Workers certainly have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in their office,
  The captive audience doctrine is particularly strong 
in the home, then, because of one’s privacy rights within the home.  It 
is the imbalance of rights—the offensive speaker’s relatively weak 
right to speak compared to the resident’s robust privacy rights within 
his home—that gives the captive audience exception in the home any 
meaning.  It stands to reason, then, that equally as important rights in 
other contexts could outweigh an offensive speaker’s right to speak. 
340 but it is exceedingly unlikely to 
be as strong as a person’s expectation of privacy in his home.341
 
 337. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970). 
  That 
concern is of no moment.  Fundamental privacy rights happen to be 
the counterweight that makes it inappropriate to expect a resident to 
walk outside of his home to avoid offensive speech, but there is no 
principle that makes privacy the only possible counterweight.  Admit-
tedly, it may be an extension of the Court’s precedents to recognize a 
captive audience exception based on fundamental rights other than 
 338. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“The ability of the government, 
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hear-
ing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded 
in an essentially intolerable manner.”). 
 339. Id. at 21–22. 
 340. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (plurality opinion) (a search of 
an employee’s office is “justified at its inception” if the there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that evidence of work-related misconduct will be uncovered). 
 341. See id. at 716 (“As with the expectation of privacy in one’s home, such an expecta-
tion in one’s place of work is ‘based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the 
history of the Amendment.’” (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 
(1984))). 
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privacy in the home, but such an extension makes sense.  There are 
other fundamental rights that are just as important as being the king 
of one’s castle. 
Equal protection is a paradigmatic example.  As Deborah Epstein 
has noted, Congress expressly enacted Title VII based on the Com-
merce Clause and on the “Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 authori-
ty ‘to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the [Four-
teenth Amendment],’”342 of which the Equal Protection Clause is one 
essential part.  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Court 
recognized this dual source of authority,343 and while the majority 
found no need to address the Fourteenth Amendment issue, Justices 
Douglas and Goldberg wrote separately to make clear that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s grant of enforcement authority would have 
been a legitimate independent basis for Title VII.344  The law was 
meant to be a “vindication of human dignity,”345
Indeed, those escape options may not even be possible.  Most 
employees cannot simply leave work to avoid harassment, lest they be 
fired.  They can ask for transfers, but that is neither a feasible option 
in small companies nor an effective option in large companies.  Fur-
thermore, while transfers to another office, building, or city may allow 
the victim to avoid her harasser, not only is moving to another city of-
ten infeasible, but the notion that harassment victims should be “run 
out of town” before the harasser has his right to abusive speech cur-
tailed is laughable.  And if the victim stays and remains subject to her 
harassment, her job performance, psychological well-being, and 
health will suffer.  Any suggestion that employees can simply avoid 
their harassers or ignore them is to misconstrue the workplace: to say 
that harassment victims in the workplace are not “captives” in the lit-
eral sense is to actually say that harassment victims who can afford not to 
work are not captives.  Therefore, female employees constitute the 
 a fundamental right 
that is assaulted by hostile environment harassment and bullying and 
cyberbullying in schools.  We should not expect harassed co-workers 
and abused students to have to look the other way, transfer, or quit in 
order to avoid their tormenter.  They have a fundamental right to the 
same opportunities as those around them. 
 
 342. Epstein, supra note 314, at 437 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
 343. 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964) (“The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress 
based the Act on § 5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
well as its power to regulate interstate commerce under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitu-
tion.”). 
 344. Id. at 283–86 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 291–93 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 345. Id. at 291 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
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quintessential captive audience.  We “should not force a woman into a 
Hobson’s choice between quitting her job” and denying herself her 
right to equal protection, “or facing a work environment in which she 
is subjected to severe or pervasive harassing speech that is not in-
flicted on her male counterparts.”346
Student victims of school bullying and cyberbullying confront a 
worse situation.  Bullying and cyberbullying victims have the same 
right, under the Equal Protection Clause,
 
347 to the same educational 
opportunities as everyone else.  That is, after all, what Title IX is about 
in the gender discrimination context.348  But one student’s right to 
the same educational opportunities as others is no less real even out-
side the Title IX umbrella.  Yet his exercise of that right is diminished 
when repeated harassment from a peer interferes with his academic 
success, mental and physical health, and self-esteem.  It would be ab-
surd to expect parents to deny their children their fundamental rights 
by taking them out of school or spending significant time and money 
placing them in new schools before a bully’s First Amendment rights 
are curtailed.  And the prospect of avoiding a harasser is even more 
dismal for students than for employees.  In the workplace, quitting is 
technically an option, albeit one rife with difficulties and virtually im-
possible for those without other means of financial support.  Students 
cannot simply quit school,349 and transferring is difficult, especially in 
small towns.  Recent bullying cases have resulted in their victims trans-
ferring to entirely different school districts,350
 
 346. Epstein, supra note 
 but that option is un-
available to those without the financial means to relocate or to those 
without an extended family willing to take them in.  Schools can 
change their students’ class schedules so that bullies and victims are 
never in class together, but these half-hearted solutions rarely work; 
everyone sees everyone in the hall, in the cafeteria, or after school.  
And neither of these options can protect a victim from cyberbullying, 
where harassment can reach its victims wherever they are located.  
314, at 425. 
 347. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 348. See, e.g., Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968 
(D. Kan. 2005) (“Damages are available only where the behavior is so severe, pervasive, 
and objectively offensive that it denies its victims the equal access to education that Title 
IX is designed to protect.” (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 
652 (1999))). 
 349. Students can be home-schooled, but few parents have the resources or ability to 
exercise this option. 
 350. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that Jamie 
transferred twice to escape his harassers). 
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In addition to the strict scrutiny and captive audience arguments, 
there is a third reason why the First Amendment should not limit ha-
rassment liability and a school’s authority to discipline bullies and cy-
berbullies.  Harassing speech, by its very nature, deserves minimal 
First Amendment protection.  Harassing speech targets one victim, 
and targeted speech has traditionally been afforded fewer constitu-
tional protections than speech aimed at larger audiences.351  The lat-
ter is more likely to have political value and the former is more likely 
to be harmful.352
V.  CONCLUSION: FINDING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE 
  Bullying and cyberbullying is similarly targeted to-
ward one person and likely has limited political value.  Undoubtedly, 
abusive speech has almost no political value compared to the arm-
band protest in Tinker, which further explains why Tinker is an inap-
propriate lens through which to evaluate bullying and cyberbullying. 
I have argued that cyberattacking and cyberbullying should be 
treated differently, with respect to potential First Amendment de-
fenses to a school’s disciplinary authority, because as single-incident 
actors, some cyberattackers are sometimes simply too common and 
generally act like immature students, whereas cyberbullies, as re-
peated harassers, are relatively rare and mimic workplace harassers in 
striking ways.353  Identity-based aggressors, however, should be treated 
the same. Within that argument, I propose a number of theories: that 
the Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence used the on-
campus/off-campus distinction as a proxy for when students are act-
ing qua students;354 that modern technology has dramatically changed 
the nature of the school and office such that presence in one location 
is meaningless;355 that neither the Court’s student speech cases nor 
any harassment cases have ever, and should ever, be restricted to con-
duct that occurs within the boundaries of the school or office or 
home;356
 
 351. See Fallon, supra note 
 that, taken together, the Court’s student speech cases reflect 
a consistent effects test as the basis for justifying school discipline of 
student speakers; and that a “captive audience” doctrine that is nei-
267, at 42. 
 352. See, e.g., Kent Greewalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 287, 292–93 (1990) (arguing that when a speaker verbally attacks a listener, the inten-
tion is to inflict emotional pain on the listener; by contrast, in the absence of the same lis-
tener, the speaker would simply be expressing his opinion). 
 353. See supra Part IV. 
 354. See supra Part III. 
 355. See supra Part III.4. 
 356. See supra Part IV.B.2.e. 
 770 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:705 
ther about the ability to escape nor the location of captivity, but ra-
ther the clash between competing fundamental rights, protects both 
harassment statutes and a school’s disciplinary authority from First 
Amendment attack.357
The practical implication of this argument is that some cyberat-
tackers will not be punished, but all identity-based aggressors and all 
cyberbullies will.  Free speech principles will protect some cyberat-
tackers if their single attacks do not touch the school’s ability to suc-
cessfully teach its students, but not those who use the sword of Inter-
net aggression to attack their victim’s identity and community.  But 
the First Amendment will not protect cyberbullies because of their 
striking similarities with harassers, a group not afforded significant 
free speech rights.
 
358  Admittedly, this leaves some bad conduct out-
side the reach of punishment, as well it should.  It forces those schools 
that want to regulate single-incident cyberattacking to do so without 
the iron fist of expulsions, suspensions, detentions, and other forms 
of punishment.  This may be the most beneficial result, as studies 
show that more than any other factor, creating a school climate where 
bullying is rejected as a social evil and where bullying victims can find 
support among their peers and teachers and in an inclusive curricu-
lum will reduce the frequency and effects of bullying in schools.359
My theory also protects the vast majority of students.  Many of us 
have engaged in immature and mean conduct, but our behavior bears 
little similarity to attacks on identity or the constant, pervasive ha-
rassment that have caused too many victimized students to commit 
  
Increasingly harsh punishments will not.  My proposal’s narrow focus 
recognizes that ultimately, punishing all bad students will not solve 
the problem of harassment and cyberharassment in schools.  Discip-
line should be left to capture the outliers, the egregious cases that de-
fy the reach of a school’s “soft power.”  After all, bullying and cyber-
bullying are social, not legal, problems.  To the extent that legal issues 
are implicated, the lawyer’s role is to provide the boundaries of rule-
making, leaving the social scientist, educator, and counselor the lati-
tude to use the most effective tools. 
 
 357. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 358. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 359. See Paul D. Flaspohler et al., Stand by Me: The Effects of Peer and Teacher Support in Mi-
tigating the Impact of Bullying on Quality of Life, 46 PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SCHOOLS 636, 638, 
646 (2009), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pits.v46:7/issuetoc (concluding 
that those students who experienced high levels of teacher and peer social support indi-
cated fewer problems with bullying and a higher quality of life in school); Julia S. Chibba-
ro, School Counselors and the Cyberbully: Interventions and Implications, 11 ASCA 65, 66–67 
(Oct. 2007). 
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suicide.  At the same time, by permitting school discipline for bullies 
and cyberbullies and identity-based aggressors, my theory protects the 
hardest hit victims from the argument that “boys will be boys” or that 
“this is all part of growing up.”360
The long-term health of the First Amendment is another benefi-
ciary of my approach.  We want to give schools the power to punish 
the most serious peer abusers and harassers, but we do not want to 
chill speech or apply the school’s iron fist to the common, everyday 
give-and-take among adolescents.  In other words, my proposal pro-
tects the First Amendment from attacks from all angles.  By clarifying 
the Court’s student speech jurisprudence as the lens through which 
we judge First Amendment defenses to a school’s punishment of a cy-
beraggressor, my proposal protects student free expression from the 
Court’s rightward drift when it comes to student speech.  To under-
mine the original Tinker vision in the name of disciplining single-
incident cyberattacking is to show little respect for students and their 
speech rights and to elevate an almost Orwellian view of the public 
school to the point where students have few, if any, rights to call their 
own. 
  
 
 360. See, e.g., Andy Birkey, Family Council Claims Success in Stopping Anti-Bullying Efforts in 
Anoka-Hennepin, MINN. INDEP. (Dec. 29, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://minnesotaindependent. 
com/75517/family-council-claims-success-in-stopping-anti-bullying-efforts-in-anoka-henne-
pin (discussing the anti-gay Minnesota’s Family Council’s campaign to prevent anti-
bullying programs because it would cause “child corruption”).  See also Casey, supra note 59 
(discussing conservative opposition to addressing the problem of bullying in schools). 
